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1 Introduction 
Over the last two decades, one of the most extensively researched area in interna-
tional finance has been the puzzling tendency of international investors to strongly 
overweight their home market in their investment portfolios instead of diversify-
ing across international markets. This widely observed phenomenon is commonly 
referred to as the home bias puzzle, which despite numerous tentative explanatory 
attempts still remains an unresolved matter in the empirical literature.  
 
As will be shown in this paper, the currently observed magnitude of the home bias 
is largely inconsistent with the development that has occurred in international  
capital markets since the early 1990s. Over time, the growing liberalization of 
financial markets in both developed and so-called emerging markets has been 
steadily accompanied by a dramatic decrease in obstacles to international invest-
ment. Globalization and a growth in trade and cross-country capital movements 
were the result of the substantial elimination of various barriers and restrictions in 
international financial markets and, consequently, most developed and many 
emerging markets can nowadays be considered open for foreign investment from 
all over the world.  
 
While, in the past, the existence of barriers across international markets might 
have been the most likely impediment to foreign equity ownership, then the     
dismantling of many of these barriers should have led to a parallel substantial  
increase in international investment. However, it can also be discerned that a 
strong reallocation of investors’ equity positions towards foreign stocks has large-
ly not materialized, at least not to such a degree as could have been expected. 
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The empirical literature so far has overwhelmingly pointed to investors’ large 
preference for domestic equity across all countries. There is also evidence that 
even though the magnitude of the home bias has slightly decreased over time, the 
phenomenon has still remained persistent and economically significant. At the 
same time, a plethora of theories has been advanced that tried to explain the   
causes of international under-diversification.  
 
This paper attempts to review the most important recent empirical explanations 
that play a useful role in understanding the home bias, and invariably includes a 
wide range of theories. In my discussion of the home bias puzzle I will address in 
particular the decisive questions of how prevalent the home bias really is, how the 
phenomenon has evolved over time, and what the most plausible explanations 
might actually be. Further, I will also try to analyze whether investors’ home bias 
is determined by a single decisive factor alone, or whether the behavior is more 
likely explained by a multitude of reasons.  
 
The thesis is organized as follows. First, in Chapter 2 the conceptual foundations 
of international portfolio investment and the various international investment     
opportunities available to investors will be discussed in greater detail. In Chapter 
3, the empirical evidence on the home bias will be presented, and I will explore 
how the phenomenon has evolved in various countries over time. There will also 
be an analysis of whether or not the home bias constitutes a preference among 
institutional investors as well. The most important empirical explanations of the 
home bias puzzle will then be examined in Chapter 4, beginning with the hypoth-
esis of information asymmetries between foreign and domestic investors, followed 
by the theory of investors’ local (geographical) bias, and concluding with the  
various theories of investor behavior. In the final chapter I will attempt to answer 
whether a general conclusion can be reached as to which one of the many expla-
nations is the most valid one, or whether all of these explanations are important in 
their own right.  
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2 International Portfolio Investment 
2.1 Principles of Portfolio Investment 
The seminal empirical studies by Markowitz (1952, 1959) and Tobin (1958) laid 
the foundation and established the normative rules of Modern Portfolio Theory 
(MPT).1 Their classical investment concepts were most significant and provided a 
framework within which optimal investment portfolios could be identified that 
would meet the investment objectives of the investor, or as Markowitz (1959) 
stated: “A good portfolio is more than a long list of stocks and bonds. It is a    
balanced whole providing the investor with protections and opportunities with 
respect to a wide range of contingencies. The investor should build toward an  
integrated portfolio which best suits his needs."2 
 
According to this theory, efficient portfolios can be defined as combinations of 
investments that potentially provide the highest possible rate of return for a     
particular level of risk of the overall portfolio (as measured by the variance of 
portfolio returns), with investors selecting the optimum asset allocation according 
to the degree of their personal risk aversion. A desired risk-reduction effect can 
then be achieved by investing in a variety of assets whose returns are not perfectly 
correlated with each other, and by spreading the risk over a wide number of secu-
rities (as it is assumed that the greater the number of securities in the portfolio, the 
less risky the portfolio in general will be). The diversification of a portfolio should 
therefore allow investors to achieve overall greater portfolio returns, at reduced 
overall portfolio risk. 
                                                 
1 This theory is also referred to as Mean-Variance Analysis (MVA). 
2 Markowitz (1959), p. 3.  
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Building on the work by Markowitz, the concept of portfolio risk has subsequent-
ly been defined in a more precise way with the introduction of the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), which effectively 
extended Markowitz’ portfolio theory by proposing the notions of systematic and 
specific risk, where the standard deviation alone as a measure of volatility was no 
longer sufficient.  
 
At the heart of the model is the common observation that through the creation of a 
fairly large enough portfolio of stocks only one type of risk can essentially be  
diversified away - the so-called unsystematic or unique risk of a portfolio, which 
refers to the risk of a possible bankruptcy of an individual asset (company) held in 
the portfolio. On the other hand, it is also assumed that even with a larger number 
of stocks the total portfolio risk can never be reduced below a certain level since 
all securities in a given market are more or less exposed to the same general   
macroeconomic movements, such as government policy, inflation or exchange 
rate changes. This type of risk is commonly called systematic or market risk. 
Within the CAPM framework, systematic risk is understood to be the central   
factor that influences the level of total return of the portfolio. Measured by beta, it 
indicates the covariance between the returns of the shares in a portfolio and the 
returns of the market as a whole, i.e. the sensitivity of the shares to general market 
movements.  
Further, a so-called market portfolio is used in the CAPM as a single benchmark 
(or guideline) for an optimal, desired portfolio that an investor is expected to hold, 
and against which the investor is able to measure the performance of his/her own 
portfolio. This is also called the normal or neutral portfolio, and the choice of 
benchmark is considered to be an important part in the analysis of efficient portfo-
lio returns.3 
                                                 
3 In practice, a proxy for the market portfolio is normally used, such as a broadly-based index of 
shares, or a value-weighted portfolio of all stocks listed on a major stock exchange.  
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By introducing an international version of the CAPM – the International Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) - the usual model can then be extended to an inter-
national setting where a world market portfolio is taken as the benchmark for  
investors’ overall portfolio holdings.4 The ICAPM implies that investors should 
hold equities from countries around the world in a proportion according to the 
relative size (world market capitalization) of the respective country, based on the 
assumption that there are no barriers to international investment. Most important-
ly, it is assumed that by diversifying internationally through the investment in 
stocks from different countries even further portfolio risk reduction can thus be 
achieved by investors, and more substantial diversification benefits can so be  
realized. 
2.2 International Portfolio Diversification 
The benefits of international portfolio diversification across equity markets have 
been recognized by the finance literature for some time. Based on the assumption 
that a relatively high degree of positive correlation does exist between assets  
within an economy (country), international diversification across national finan-
cial markets that are not perfectly correlated with each other does represent an       
important way for investors to reduce their overall portfolio risk and/or to enhance 
the average expected rate of return of their portfolios.5 For example, monetary, 
institutional, political or economical policies may vary considerably across mar-
kets and countries, and can so provide for large, country-specific variations of  
returns. Thus, if stock markets in different countries do not move together perfect-
ly, the overall risk of the portfolio can be better diversified away, and substantial 
gains can potentially be achieved from an internationally well diversified portfo-
lio. 
 
                                                 
4 For instance, the Morgan Stanley Capital International Index (MSCI) as a global index.  
5 Evidence on a pattern of relatively low correlations between major national financial markets 
was demonstrated, for example, in an early paper by Adler and Dumas (1983), who also suggested 
the possible reduction of portfolio risk from international diversification. 
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Over the past 30 years, a strong case for foreign equity investment has been estab-
lished by a range of important early quantitative studies on international diversifi-
cation. The study by Grubel (1968) was the first to empirically document signifi-
cant evidence of possible large benefits available to American investors who   
incorporated foreign equities into their portfolios. In the paper, two sets of interna-
tional portfolios were constructed and then compared to a portfolio consisting 
purely of domestic stocks. The first set was an international portfolio that        
contained shares from eleven major industrialized countries, while the second 
international portfolio was comprised of the same countries but not Japan, South 
Africa, and Australia.6 The empirical estimates clearly proved that international 
diversification would have permitted investors in general to achieve higher rates 
of return from their international portfolios than from investing in the U.S. market 
alone, with a significant gain of 68.0 percent in the annual rate of return in the 
first and a gain of 18.7 percent in the second case, over the period from 1959 to 
year-end 1966. Based on these results, Grubel already suggested that more inter-
national diversification should and would take place in the future. 
 
Similarly, the subsequent study by Levy and Sarnat (1970) also examined interna-
tional portfolio investment by American investors in 28 countries (over the period 
from 1951 to 1967), and successfully demonstrated the same and further conclu-
sions as in Grubel (1968). International diversification was not only shown to be 
beneficial for investors, but also to be especially rewarding after including a rela-
tively high proportion of shares from developing and low-income countries in the 
composition of diversified portfolios. Considering the relatively low correlation of 
these markets with the U.S., investment in developing countries such as Venezue-
la, South Africa, New Zealand or Mexico had a significantly positive effect on the 
overall portfolio and was shown to materially improve the risk-return trade-off for 
American investors. On the other hand, investment in common market countries 
(like Canada) that had very high positive return correlations with the U.S. market 
could not be shown to be optimal for investors. 
                                                 
6 The first set included the U.S., the U.K., Canada, West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, The 
Netherlands, Japan, Australia, and South Africa. 
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The third seminal paper by Solnik (1974) focused specifically on the question of 
how effective international diversification could be for the reduction of overall 
portfolio risk in terms of the variability of returns, and showed that over an evalu-
ation period from 1966 to 1979 an internationally well-diversified portfolio would 
have been only half as risky as a similar portfolio consisting entirely of U.S.    
securities (with the same number of holdings). That evidence again confirmed that 
international portfolios could offer a significantly greater risk reduction than  
purely domestic portfolios. 
 
Later on, Grauer and Hakansson (1987) equally showed that U.S. investors could 
reap gains from including non-domestic equities in their portfolios that were large 
and higher than those generated by a portfolio consisting entirely of domestic 
stocks (over a longer sample period from 1968 to 1985), while yet another  paper 
by Odier and Solnik (1993) even put the annualized total return of an international 
stock portfolio at 19 percent whereas, in comparison, a purely U.S. (domestic) 
market portfolio would only have achieved a total return of 13.3 percent. 
 
More recent evidence was also provided by Gerke, Mager, and Roehrs (2005) for 
a market other than the U.S., namely for Germany. Based on their results, a Ger-
man investor would have greatly optimized his/her portfolio performance by ven-
turing abroad, over the sample period from January 1980 to October 2001. In fact, 
it was shown that it would have been optimal for investors to not in invest in the 
German stock market at all, and that even a naïve diversification strategy of an 
equally-weighted portfolio would have provided far superior results than investing 
in the German market alone.  
Finally, the study by Forbes (2010) showed that U.S. investors could have earned 
significantly more from their foreign investment in a broad global equity index 
than from investing in a U.S. equity market index, namely a return of almost 14 
percent as compared to less than 8 percent from the purely domestic investment. 
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As all the papers above have illustrated there is heavy support for the theory that 
substantial benefits are to be achieved from international diversification, and by 
now the advantages have been well recognized. The general benefits have not 
only led to a growth in international portfolio investment over the past couple of 
years, but also to the establishment of a whole range of international investment 
strategies that allow investors to access foreign national markets more easily. In 
the next chapter, I will therefore briefly explore the most important opportunities 
of international investment available to investors, as well as the question of 
whether these opportunities can indeed provide the promised benefits.  
2.2.1 International Investment Opportunities 
Traditionally the concept of International Portfolio Investment (IPI) has only   
referred to the acquisition of foreign assets that trade in their respective foreign 
markets. More recently, however, the introduction of so-called home-made inter-
national diversification has allowed investors to purchase claims on foreign assets 
that are traded in their home market, which means that diversification benefits can 
potentially be achieved by simply staying at home and investing internationally 
from there. 
 
International Mutual Funds, for example, focus exclusively on a broad base of 
international securities from specific countries or regions. By adding such interna-
tionally diversified funds to their existing portfolio, this strategy might enable 
investors to achieve substantial diversification benefits over a sustained period of 
time, as has been confirmed early on in the paper by Cumby and Glen (1990), for 
example. Over a period from January 1982 to June 1988, the performance deliv-
ered by a sample of fifteen international funds was shown to have been superior to 
that by a U.S. national market index, with all the diversified funds offering better 
benefits than otherwise the mere investment in a U.S. index would have.  
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On the other hand, Closed-End Country Funds (CECFs) are traded on organized 
stock exchanges similar to common stocks, thereby enabling investors to actively 
invest in the securities of a particular foreign country.7 In contrast to open-end 
mutual funds that do not limit the amount of outstanding shares available to inves-
tors, closed-end funds offer only a fixed number of shares for trading on a stock 
exchange. This provides for their asset base to be relatively stable and for the fund 
to be better able to concentrate on less liquid markets. As such, many of these 
funds are especially relevant for investing in emerging markets. While earlier  
papers by Chang, Eun and Kolodny (1995) and Errunza, Hogan and Hung (1999) 
concluded that these funds offered somewhat limited diversification potential and 
alone were not enough as an investment strategy to fully capture international 
diversification benefits, more recent empirical evidence by Cao (2005) and 
Charitou, Makris and Nishiotis (2006) showed that CECFs were a good substitute 
for investing directly in foreign indices, and that they could indeed provide at least 
similar benefits to investors. 
 
Exchange-Traded Index Funds (ETFs) are equally traded on a stock exchange. 
They are designed to replicate the index of a given foreign country in order to 
track the performance of this market’s publicly-traded securities, and generally 
offer a more efficient and lower-cost alternative to other traditional tools (such as 
closed-end country funds).8 For international investors, especially country-specific 
or international ETFs allow for easy access to major international stock markets. 
However, they appear not to be well-suited as a stand-alone investment, but 
should rather be included in existing diversified portfolios in order for them to 
deliver significant diversification benefits, as seen in Miffre (2007) for example. 
                                                 
7 U.K. investment trusts are the equivalent to U.S. closed-end funds. While U.S. closed-end funds 
are primarily held by individual retail investors, U.K. investment trusts are mostly favored by 
institutional investors. See Bekaert and Urias (1996) for more information.  
8 In the U.S, the first ETF - the Standard & Poor’s Depository Receipt (SPDR) – was introduced 
and traded on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) in 1993 to passively mimic and track the 
S&P 500 Index, and soon became quite popular. As of June 2012, there are 1,220 ETFs available             
in the U.S., with over $1.166 trillion in assets. Source: Investment Company Institute, at 
www.ici.org/etf_resources/research/etfs_06_12 (last accessed July 26, 2012). 
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Another investment alternative are depository receipt programs, which nowadays 
do exist in many countries. In the United States, for example, American Deposito-
ry Receipts (ADRs) are issued by a bank to U.S. investors as a financial instrument 
for owning foreign (non-U.S.) stocks, effectively making those investors unregis-
tered shareholders of companies in foreign countries without the need to directly 
access the overseas market itself.9 ADRs are then listed on a U.S. stock  exchange 
(like the NYSE or NASDAQ), or traded over-the-counter. As such, ADRs offer a 
relatively easier way for U.S. investors to diversify internationally than buying 
and selling the actual shares themselves, since all transactions will be carried out 
in the local currency, and investors will also be able to avoid paying stamp duty. 
For non-U.S. firms, on the other hand, ADRs represent a great way to raise new 
money by creating a liquid secondary market in the U.S. and thereby facilitating 
access to an enlarged and more diverse shareholder base.  
There are a variety of empirical papers that have illustrated and confirmed the 
diversification benefits of ADRs. For example, Jiang (1998) studied 113 ADRs 
from eight countries over the period from 1980 to 1994, and found that significant 
diversification benefits could be achieved with ADR portfolios. Also the study by 
Errunza, Hogan and Huang (1999) supported this evidence. Further on, Kabir, 
Hassan and Maroney (2011) then showed that the diversification potential of 
ADRs varied somewhat across different countries and also over different sample 
periods. During the early period of the 1980s, U.S. investors would have needed 
to hold both ADRs and foreign country indices in order to achieve diversification 
benefits, while later on (during the early and late 1990s) – as more and more 
ADRs were listed in the U.S. – ADRs had become a good substitute to country 
indices. On the other hand, for diversifying across Asian countries investors 
should have held both ADRs as well as country portfolios in order to achieve  
significant diversification benefits; investment in ADRs alone would not have 
been enough to obtain any higher returns than investing in Asian markets directly.  
 
                                                 
9 The first ADR was introduced by J.P. Morgan in 1927. Source: JP Morgan Chase, at 
www.adr.com/Home/LoadPDF?CMSID=88b09551120043cface03554006845cb (last accessed 
July 20, 2012). 
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3 The Home Bias Phenomenon 
3.1 Introduction 
The previously discussed literature on international portfolio investment has so far 
well illustrated the benefits and the numerous opportunities of international     
diversification that are available to investors. At the same time, however, an even 
larger part of financial research has also documented that the share of foreign 
stocks in investment portfolios has, for the most part, remained substantially small 
compared to the share of domestic equity in investors’ portfolios – a phenomenon 
which, to date, does still represent an unresolved issue in international finance. 
This encroachment of international portfolio theory became widely known as the 
equity home bias phenomenon, and is commonly referred to as the extent to which 
portfolio investment is largely concentrated in the domestic equity market of the 
investor instead of internationally, as well as to the fact that the observed propor-
tions of foreign equities held are too small relative to what is implied by standard 
portfolio theory. Since a definite answer or explanation as to why domestic inves-
tors show this remarkable tendency has yet to be provided, this phenomenon is 
also frequently called the home bias puzzle.10  
3.2 Empirical Evidence on the Home Bias  
3.2.1 Home Bias and Private Investors 
The first notable study that described and highlighted the extent of investors’  
equity home bias was presented early on by French and Poterba (1991), who not 
only empirically demonstrated the existence of incomplete diversification among 
international portfolios, but who also confirmed that the share of foreign equity     
holdings was indeed very low. American investors, for example, were shown to 
invest almost 94 percent of their total equity holdings in the U.S. home market; 
similarly, Japanese investors even held an astonishing 98 percent of domestic  
equity in their investment portfolios, while in Britain an estimated 82 percent was 
held domestically at year-end 1989.  
                                                 
10 In Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), for example. 
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These holding estimates, in turn, thus implied that the international (foreign)   
equity weights in investors’ portfolio only ranged from a low of 1.9 percent for 
Japan to a high of 18 percent for the U.K. – a result which significantly confirmed 
investors' home bias.  
 
In the following, the study by Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) documented an even 
stronger home bias for eight major international markets, from statistical data as 
early as of December 1987. They reported that, for example, only 2 percent of 
portfolios in the U.S. market was invested in foreign equities, while the strongest 
degree of home bias was shown to exist in the country of Sweden, where nearly 
all equity was held domestically at year-end 1987. 
 
Tesar and Werner (1995) analyzed the evolution of aggregate foreign stock    
holdings of residents from five major countries over a larger time period from 
1970 to 1990. They concluded that even though foreign equity investment had         
increased since the mid-1970s, the share of overall portfolio investment allocated 
to foreign securities had still remained substantially lower than what standard 
models of optimal international portfolio diversification would have suggested. 
For the U.S. and the U.K., for example, estimated foreign equity holdings (as a 
fraction of domestic stock market capitalization) were put at about 3.31 percent 
and 23.5 percent in 1990, respectively, while the estimated share of foreign     
equities had even been as low as 1.4 percent in the U.S. in 1975.11 These results 
further confirmed the apparent evidence on the home bias; however, they also 
showed that the home bias had been declining somewhat over time, which was 
then equally confirmed in their subsequent study (Tesar and Werner, 1998). Here, 
the fraction of U.S. investors holdings of foreign equity was shown to have     
increased to 10 percent by 1996, while for other countries the implied estimated 
percentages of the non-domestic share in investors’ portfolios were reported at 
22.5 in the U.K., 18.2 in Germany, 11.2 in Canada, and 5.3 in Japan as of 1996.12 
                                                 
11 No data on foreign equity investment in the U.K. was reported for the year 1975.  
12Similarly, Bohn and Tesar (1996) showed that the share of foreign equities in U.S. portfolios had 
increased to 8 percent by 1994, suggesting that investors were diversifying more internationally. 
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Another study by Gerke, Mager, Roehrs (2005) presented evidence on the home 
bias among private investors in Germany, where the fraction of foreign equities in 
individual investors’ portfolio was reported at 21 percent in 1987, and then much 
higher at 41 percent, as of year-end 2000. More recently, Coeurdacier and 
Gourinchas (2011) showed that the foreign equities share in portfolios in that 
country has even risen to a level of 47 percent as of 2008. Overall, however, they 
showed evidence that the home bias has persistent all over the world, with per-
centage shares of home equities in investors‘ portfolios at 77.2 for the U.S., 80.2 
for Canada, 73.5 for  Japan, 66 for France, and 52 for Italy in 2008. 
 
International under-diversification has also been documented and evidenced in 
empirical papers that focused especially on the foreign ownership share of equity 
within a specific country, and strongly highlighted the home bias to exist all over 
the world. For example, Kang and Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist and Robertsson 
(2001) investigated the home bias by analyzing the share of foreign ownership in 
firms listed on Japanese and Swedish stock exchanges, respectively. Kang and 
Stulz (1997) revealed that the equally-weighted market value of foreign owner-
ship as a percentage of the total market capitalization of all firms in Japan had 
never exceeded a value of 6 percent (with an average value of 3.76 percent) over 
the sample period from 1975 to 1991, a result which significantly confirmed the    
evidence of low foreign equity holdings among companies in that country. The 
paper by Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) studied the foreign ownership of equity 
in Sweden over the period from 1991 to 1997, which included all Swedish firms 
listed at that time. During that period, foreign investment holdings were shown to 
have increased from just 8.2 percent to about 32.4 percent in that country.13  
 
                                                 
13 While this increase might seem impressive, it was reported to have been partly due to regulatory 
changes during the sample period. Before 1993, foreigners were allowed by law to only hold unre-
stricted shares and not restricted shares, with the proportion of unrestricted shares being limited to 
20 percent of the voting rights and 40 percent of the equity of a firm. This restriction was formally 
abolished in January 1993, that is within the sample period. 
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For Korea, Choe, Kho and Stulz (2001) noted that foreign investors had owned 
only roughly 18 percent of the total market capitalization of stocks at the end of 
1998, while Kho, Stulz and Warnock (2009) reported that the equally-weighted 
average of foreign ownership in Korean firms had only been 6.18 percent in 1996, 
but subsequently almost doubled to 11.25 percent in 2004.  
3.2.2 Home Bias and Institutional Investors 
The empirical evidence so far has primarily been focusing on the overall poor 
international portfolio diversification among private investors, however, it is    
essential that institutional investors should be included in the analysis as well, as 
institutional investors might first be assumed – given their profession – to be bet-
ter informed about financial markets in general, and to be able to better under-
stand the advantages of international diversification than individual investors. 
While the home bias will be shown to be less severe than the bias of private inves-
tors, the evidence also proves that institutional investors still do not capture port-
folio diversification to its fullest extent. 
 
The early study by Lewis (1999) reported data on mutual and pension funds’ 
holdings of foreign securities from five developed countries from 1980 to 1993. 
Among pension funds, foreign holdings were shown to have increased slightly to 
about 5.7 percent in the U.S. and to 19.7 percent in the U.K., for example, while  
mutual funds’ data, in general, presented higher foreign shares of 10.1 percent and 
36 percent for the U.S. and the U.K., respectively. German mutual funds even had 
an astonishingly high level of 45.2 percent invested in foreign securities by 
1993.14 Overall, the foreign portion in both mutual and pension funds was shown 
to have increased gradually in all countries considered over the period. 
                                                 
14 The later study by Gerke, Mager and Roehrs (2005) even reported that the proportion of foreign 
equities in German institutional investors’ portfolios had remarkably increased to a high of 70 
percent by year-end of 2000. 
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More recently, the paper by Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005) tried to establish specif-
ically whether the home bias in mutual funds was indeed a much widespread  
phenomenon across various developed and emerging countries. The results for all 
the mutual funds from the 26 countries examined in the study showed that they 
had allocated on aggregate a much larger share of holdings towards the domestic 
market than what the world capitalization weight of the country would have im-
plied (as of 1999 and 2000). For example, in Greece funds were shown to exhibit 
the highest domestic bias with 93.5 percent of holdings allocated towards the 
home market (as compared to the country’s world capitalization weight of merely 
0.46 percent), while in Austria a fraction of 6.77 percent of mutual fund alloca-
tions was invested in the home market (as opposed to the world market capitaliza-
tion weight of Austria of only 0.09 percent), as investors were not fully taking 
advantage of international diversification. 
Another study by Huang and Shiu (2009) analyzed the foreign equity ownership 
of investors classified as “Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors” in Taiwan, a 
definition that included banks, insurance companies, securities firms, mutual 
funds, and other institutions. Over the period from beginning of the third quarter 
of 1994 to year-end of 2001, over 90 percent of the market capitalization of that 
country was shown to have been held by both domestic individual and institution-
al investors, as foreign institutional investors accounted on average for a mere 2.2 
percent of the share ownership. Also, overall there was little or no foreign owner-
ship in half of the stocks analyzed. 
Finally, Hau and Rey (2008) studied the investment behavior of equity mutual 
funds from the most developed financial markets across the world, over a period 
from 1997 to 2002. In that paper the average degree of home bias among the 
funds was found to be low, and also not to be as pronounced as the aggregate 
home bias of other investors. The study also showed that generally funds that 
were larger in size were also more likely to be more internationalized and to    
invest more in foreign countries (and different sectors) when compared to smaller 
funds, thus offering investors more potential benefits. Again, the extent of the 
home bias was proven to be much smaller among institutional investors, which 
was in line with the majority of the other papers presented earlier. 
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3.2.3 Development of the Home Bias over Time 
Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004) was the first study to use higher quality 
cross-border holdings data from the comprehensive benchmark surveys (also 
known as asset surveys) on U.S. citizens’ holdings of foreign securities as con-
ducted by the U.S. Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board, which 
are part of an internationally coordinated effort under the auspices of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) to improve the data and the collection of information 
on portfolio asset holdings, and also to help demonstrate the development of stock 
holdings over time.15 The first three comprehensive benchmark surveys have been 
conducted by the U.S. as of March 1994, December 1997, and December 2001; 
beginning in 2003, the surveys were then conducted on an annual basis. 
 
Ahearne et al. argued that prior to these surveys no accurate estimates had existed 
that would provide both reliable and high quality data on a security-by-security 
basis. Many previous studies had based their results on cross-border holdings  
estimates from accumulated capital flows data, which were generally designed to 
track the flow of money between countries in the balance of payments accounts, 
rather than to estimate portfolio holdings as such.16 
 
                                                 
15 With many foreign countries still lacking a system for timely and precise estimates on foreign 
portfolio holdings, the first IMF-sponsored Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) on 
cross-border equity holdings initially included a host of only 29 countries in 1997; in contrast, the 
latest available survey was conducted with an increased participation rate of 75 countries in 2010, 
covering several industrial countries, transition economies, emerging market economies, as well as 
small economies with international financial centers. The CPIS set about collecting wide infor-
mation on the cross-border holdings of equities and long- and short-term debt securities, broken 
down by the country of residency of the issuer. That way, the CPIS was able to provide compre-
hensive global information and more precise data on the cross-border ownership of securities, as 
well as on the geographical distribution of cross-border holdings of securities. Source: Internation-
al Monetary Fund, at http://cpis.imf.org (last accessed July 23, 2012).  
16 See the studies by French and Poterba (1991), Tesar and Werner (1995), or Cooper and Kaplanis 
(1994), for example. 
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According to these benchmark surveys, U.S. holdings of foreign equity as a share 
of total equity market capitalization have increased consistently and strongly over 
time: while the fraction of U.S. investment in foreign equities had only been about 
6 percent in 1994, it was shown to have grown steadily to about 10 percent in 
1997, and to 14 percent in 2003.17 Most recent survey results even indicate that 
the total market value of U.S. portfolio investment in foreign equities has already 
reached a level of about $4,647 billion by year-end 2010, as compared to a value 
of just $1,197 billion in 1997, which signals a substantial increase over that     
period.18  
 
Table 1 allows for a better illustration of the gradual increase in foreign holdings 
in investors' portfolios, and shows the overall market value of U.S. holdings of 
foreign securities from December 2001 to December 2010. 
 
Table 1: Market Value of U.S. Holdings of Foreign Securities, by Type of Security, 
as of the Survey Dates19 
 
 
                                                 
17 As reported in Thomas, Warnock and Wongswan (2004), using CPIS data.  
18 In comparison, total foreign equity holdings in Austria were measured at a level of $11,5 billion 
in 1997 versus $86,6 billion in 2010, equally showing an increase over the period. Source: Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, at http://elibrary-data.imf.org/Report.aspx?Report=9492637&Country=111 
(last accessed July 23, 2012). 
19 Source: Department of the U.S. Treasury and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve     
System, at http://treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/shc2010r.pdf (last 
accessed July 23, 2012).  
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After Ahearne et al. (2004), a growing number of authors have especially used  
the CPIS in their studies to conduct measures of the extent of the home bias in 
order to illustrate its evolution over time. As such, the magnitude of the home bias 
of a country is most frequently computed within the ICAPM framework as the     
deviation from the world market portfolio (the benchmark portfolio) which im-
plies that international investors should hold the equity of a given country in a 
proportion that is equal to that country’s share of world market capitalization. The 
measure of the extent of a country’s home bias can then be calculated as one   
minus the ratio of the share of foreign equity holdings in domestic portfolios to 
the foreign equity share in the world market portfolio - or, in other words, as the 
relative difference between the actual (ACTi) and optimal (OPTi) foreign portfolio 
holdings of a given country i (with actual portfolio holdings as determined by 
CPIS data):  
 
1 ii
i
ACTHB
OPT
= −
 
This measure will take the value of one if no foreign equities are held by domestic 
investors, and the value of zero if the weight of foreign equities is given by their 
world market capitalization, i.e. when investors do not exhibit any home bias at 
all. For example, if a country had actual foreign equity holdings of 10 percent but 
should optimally hold 90 percent of its portfolio in foreign assets (according to its 
world market capitalization), then the home bias would reach a measure of 89 
percent. 
 
The main results provided by the empirical studies that have employed this   
measure of the home bias have unequivocally shown that while there is evidence 
of an overall moderate decline of the home bias in most countries over time, it has 
generally remained at high levels throughout sample periods.  
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The study by Stulz (2005), for example, illustrated that before the 1990s interna-
tional diversification had been trivial and almost non-existent in the U.S., and that 
the share of foreign stocks in U.S. investors’ portfolios has only gradually in-
creased afterwards – a development that was also reflected in the home bias 
measures, which have simultaneously decreased and, for example, reached 78 
percent in 2001, as shown in Table 1.  
Figure 1: The Home Bias of U.S. Investors (1977 - 2003)20 
 
 
Other studies that have used home bias measures have tried not just to analyze the 
development of the home bias around the world, but also to determine whether 
emerging markets or developed markets could be considered more biased in their 
portfolio allocations. They found somewhat mixed results.  
 
                                                 
20 Source: Stulz (2005), p. 58.  
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De Santis and Gerard (2006), for instance, presented generally higher levels of 
home bias for developed countries, and especially for the U.S. and Canada, both 
of which countries by far had the largest home bias measures of 92 percent and 93 
percent, respectively (among fixed-income markets in 2001). Also Japan and 
Spain were shown to have very high home bias levels with measures of 88 percent 
and 80 percent, respectively. Overall, however, there was also evidence of a  
gradual decline in the general equity home bias around the world, from an overall 
level of 77 percent to 63 percent over the period from 1997 to 2001.  
In contrast, the study by Sercú and Vanpee (2007) presented a somewhat different 
picture, using home bias estimates from CPIS data for a total of 42 countries from 
all over the world, as of December 2005. It was shown that, for instance, Austria 
had a relatively low home bias measure of 58.2 percent, while Indonesia had the 
highest measure was of 99.5 percent with almost all equity invested in domestic 
stocks. In general, the home equity bias estimates were lower for developed coun-
tries and higher for emerging markets - a result which, more recently, has also 
been confirmed by Bekaert and Wang (2009) and by Sendi and Bellalah (2010). 
The latter paper concluded that even though the home bias had been large in    
developed countries as well (in the U.S., for example, at a level between 57 per-
cent and 68 percent, and in Asian developed markets above 90 percent over the 
period from 1996 to 2007), emerging markets like Brazil and Chile had main-
tained the highest levels at almost 100 percent. Also in emerging European and 
Asian markets the domestic shares in investors’ portfolio had equally been at 
about 99 percent over the period, whereas a relative decrease in the home bias 
among emerging countries could only be shown for Argentina, Mexico and Peru.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that there is ample evidence that the home bias has been 
falling fastest in European countries that are part of the so-called euro area, as 
shown in Baele, Pungulescu and Ter Horst (2007), for example. In that study it 
was reported that as overall home bias levels have been decreasing all over the 
world from 1973 to 2004, the decline in the home bias in the euro area has con-
sistently been 7 to 8 percent higher annually than in any other country in the sam-
ple. This important aspect will be explored in more detail in the following. 
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3.2.4 The Formation of the EMU and the Home Bias 
Starting in 2002, the countries of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain,        
followed by Slovenia in 2007, Malta and Cyprus in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, and 
Estonia in 2011, effectively gave up their national currencies by adopting a single 
common currency - the euro. In the context of international portfolio investment, 
the creation of the eurozone not only helped enhance financial trade integration 
and reduce the economic significance of national borders within the monetary 
union, but also eliminated any exchange rate risk among the participating coun-
tries with the fixation of the euro exchange rate. Also cross-country transaction 
costs were substantially diminished, which improved the liquidity of cross-border 
trade and significantly facilitated access to European markets for international 
investors. 
 
Much of the evidence that euro-area countries have become more integrated after 
the formation of the EMU is pointing to a reallocation of portfolio holdings of 
investors located in the EMU towards other euro-area members. Moreover, it has 
also been shown that after the European unification process these countries be-
came more inclined to invest in each other than anywhere else. This phenomenon 
has also been called euro-area bias, and refers to the regional bias of investors 
from euro-area countries. For instance, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) found that 
a significant proportion of 48 percent of total cross-border equity investments had 
been allocated by euro area members towards other euro-area members by the end 
of 2001, while the paper by Berkel (2006) reported on average 62 percent larger 
and increasing cross-border investment flows between Germany and other euro-
area member countries when compared to portfolio flows between Germany and 
non-euro-area countries (such as the U.K. or Denmark), for the period from 1987 
to 2002.21 It was also reported that euro-area investors had actively re-balanced 
their portfolios and increased their portfolio allocations towards other euro-area 
countries by about 12.7 percent from 1997 to 2001 (De Santis and Gerard, 2006).  
                                                 
21 See also the paper by Haselmann and Herwartz (2010) for evidence on increased euro-area  
holdings among German investors. 
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Schoenmaker and Bosch (2008) found that while the regional bias had increased 
by 8 percent for euro-area countries from 1997 to 2004, the regional bias among 
the three non-EMU countries had actually decreased by 9 percent over the same 
time period (as shown in Figure 2), which was also consistent with the theory of 
increased economic integration among the EMU member countries.  
Figure 2: Regional Equity Bias per Region (1997 vs. 2004)22 
 
More importantly, the shift and increase in portfolio holdings among euro-area 
countries towards other euro-area members has also been shown to be related to 
an overall observed reduction in the equity home bias in those countries.23 Signif-
icantly, the arrival of the euro and the accompanied ongoing financial integration 
in Europe has not only facilitated a decrease in the home bias, but the decrease has 
also been nowhere as pronounced as in these countries when compared to other 
countries around the world. There is also much empirical evidence on lower euro-
area home bias levels. The most dramatic drop in the home bias among euro-area 
countries has been reported in Foad (2012), where the evidence showed that intra-
euro-area home bias had fallen from 67.7 percent prior to 1999 to merely 29 per-
cent after the formation of the euro area. Meanwhile, across non-euro countries 
the bias had decreased only slightly from 92.2 percent to 84.9 percent after 1999. 
                                                 
22 Schoenmaker and Bosch (2008), p. 26. 
23 Balli, Basher and Ozer-Balli (2010) called this the switch from home bias to euro bias. 
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Figure 3 illustrates the more dramatic reduction in the home bias in EMU coun-
tries and in other European countries when compared to the change in home bias 
levels in the U.S. and in other non-EMU countries, as shown in Schoenmaker and 
Bosch (2008) for the years 1997 and 2004. They also investigated whether the 
change in the home bias should be considered to be only of temporary or indeed 
of permanent nature. From 1997 - two years before the arrival of the euro – to 
2001, the average home bias for euro-area countries was shown to have decreased 
from 85 percent to 78 percent; the home bias has then also remained at that level 
until 2004. In contrast, the home bias of the U.S., for example, was reported to 
have still been at around 81 percent in 2004 - an only slight decrease from the 83 
percent as reported in 1997, and not as significant as within the euro area.24  
Figure 3: Equity Home Bias per Region (1997 vs. 2004)25 
 
                                                 
24 De Santis and Gerard (2006) similarly reported a decrease in the average home bias across euro-
area countries, from 77 percent in 1997 to 63 percent in 2001. 
25 Schoenmaker and Bosch (2008), p. 25. 
  24 
4 Empirical Explanations of the Home Bias 
Over the last couple of years, significant financial research has not only empha-
sized the disproportionately high concentration of domestic equities in investors’ 
portfolios and the poor exploitation of international diversification benefits avail-
able to them. At the same time, a substantial range of explanations of the home 
equity bias phenomenon has also been established, citing a varied number of insti-
tutional, political, and even behavioral factors.  
 
Initial explanations have focused most prominently on country risk factors that 
constitute so-called institutional or explicit barriers to investment, which are typi-
cally government-imposed and might include official country restrictions like  
capital market or exchange controls, foreign ownership restrictions, as well as 
legal or regulatory barriers such as weak or inexistent laws to prevent insider  
trading and to protect shareholders. These directly observable barriers to invest-
ment might otherwise make the repatriation of dividends, interest or principal 
more difficult for foreign investors, for example, and deter them from participat-
ing in national stock markets. Also, the share of stock ownership available to for-
eign investors might be limited to holding only a certain (small) fraction of the 
stock market or of certain economic sectors.26 
 
However, it is also true that many of these obstacles to foreign investment have 
essentially been diminished with the globalization of the world economy in recent 
decades. Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, most Latin American and 
many other developing countries, for example, made significant moves towards 
liberalizing their capital markets and started to experience advanced economic 
growth that, in turn, also allowed and encouraged an increase of foreign equity 
investment inflows into these countries.  
                                                 
26 For example, 90 percent of China’s stock market was still unavailable to foreigners in 1997, as 
reported in Ahearne et al. (2004).  
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At the same time, the fact that countries all over the world became more liberal-
ized has also led to a change in the larger global environment and to a great extent 
spurred a growth in international financial markets towards becoming a more  
unified world capital market, i.e. towards more financial market integration.27 
Many countries also succeeded to benefit from international financial investment 
by becoming more transparent and thereby more attractive to foreign investors.28  
 
As a result of these developments, direct barriers to investment such as capital 
controls and high foreign market entry costs have been significantly reduced over 
the past two decades, and such explicit barriers to investment nowadays are no 
longer thought enough to significantly explain either the observed portfolio allo-
cations nor the propensity of investors to heavily invest in their home country. 
Early on, the papers by French and Poterba (1991) and Cooper and Kaplanis 
(1994) have already argued that direct barriers to investment (like transaction 
costs) were relatively unimportant for analyzing and explaining the home bias 
phenomenon; later, Ahearne et al. (2004) also showed that these barriers should 
rather be considered of second-order importance as an explanation of the home 
bias. 
 
                                                 
27 While there is much evidence that the world capital markets have indeed become more        
integrated over the nineties, an investigation by Bekaert and Harvey (2003) did suggest that this 
assumption might not always be the case. They showed that a number of emerging markets    
rather exhibited a degree of integration that was changing over time, and that some of those    
markets were becoming (again) less integrated into the world market after years of demonstrating 
regulatory chances. In their study, only four of twelve emerging countries (namely Korea, Mexico, 
Thailand, and Taiwan) had higher integration measures in the 1990s than before that period. 
28 Transparency generally refers to the availability and quality of (financial) information. For  
example, the accuracy of a country’s macroeconomic data, national bureaucratic practices or the 
observance of accounting standards are all acknowledged to be important country characteristics  
reflecting its degree of transparency. Gelos and Wei (2005), for instance, not only showed that 
less-developed countries could also be considered less transparent (or opaque) than other coun-
tries, but that a lack of transparency within a country was generally associated with less interna-
tional investment towards that country as well. 
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More recent evidence in the empirical literature has therefore particularly empha-
sized that indirect barriers to investment play a substantial role in explaining the 
home bias. These are also called implicit or unobservable barriers to investment.  
Here, in particular the theory of the existence of informational asymmetries     
between investors from different countries has become important, while alterna-
tive explanations focusing on implicit barriers also explore investors’ bias towards 
geographically more proximate companies, as well as behavioral approaches that 
suggest that investment behavior is largely driven by psychological biases (like 
investors’ familiarity or overconfidence). 
 
All of these explanations have received notable attention in recent years, and the 
research by the international finance literature has not only allowed for new     
insights on the subject, but also potentially offered a better understanding of the 
phenomenon. The fundamental paper by Lewis (1999) was the first to present not 
only both a comprehensive and thorough review on the home bias puzzle, but also 
an examination of several of the main explanations for the home equity bias. 
However she concluded that, so far, no single explanation has emerged as the  
definite one: “Two decades of research on equity home bias have yet to provide a 
definite answer as to why domestic investors do not invest more heavily in foreign 
assets."29  
4.1 Information Asymmetries 
This theory claims that a majority of the home bias phenomenon can be explained 
for by informational issues, and essentially suggests that domestic investors are 
able to hold more valuable information about stocks from their home country in 
contrast to foreign investors, who will consequently find themselves at an infor-
mational disadvantage when investing in that country.  
 
                                                 
29 See Lewis (1999), p. 589.  
  27 
The early paper by Gehrig (1993) postulated that asymmetries in information 
were the main determinant of the home equity bias. He showed that being better 
informed about the risk-return characteristics of domestic stocks would lead to a 
stronger domestic bias in portfolio holdings, and that foreign investments would 
therefore be viewed by an investor as on average more risky than equivalent    
domestic investments. Domestic investors were so believed to enjoy a so-called 
home court advantage relative to their foreign counterparts in terms of infor-
mation availability. As a result, such an asymmetric information structure across 
financial markets was assumed to immensely complicate foreign investment and 
to lead investors to hold under-diversified portfolios.  
 
As will be shown below, the information asymmetry hypothesis has since become 
a recurring theme in a greater part of the home bias literature, and has been      
analyzed from a broad angle in a number of empirical studies. 
4.1.1 The Effect of Firm Visibility 
One of the primary causes of the home bias phenomenon might be the inability of 
many foreign firms to attract the initial attention of potential investors. At a basic 
level, investors may just not be aware of the existence of all the stocks available 
to them internationally, and may therefore just invest in a select few ones that  
they already know about and/or have prior information on. Based on this incom-
plete information, any given investor will therefore only diversify his/her portfolio 
inadequately and so contribute to the extent of the home bias.  
In this context, Merton (1987) was the first to develop the so-called investor 
recognition hypothesis, which implies that rational investors do primarily invest in 
firms that are already familiar to them, i.e. domestic firms. Along this reasoning it 
is so assumed that investors typically put more of their money in those stocks that 
are well known and on which generally more information is available. Relatively 
large firms or companies with global operations around the world, for example, 
can so be considered to be more visible to investors, given their size and presence 
in the market. Information about such companies might potentially be more  
readily available to investors who, in turn, can thus be expected to hold more of 
their investments in these stocks accordingly. 
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4.1.1.1 The Size Bias 
The relationship between the importance of firm size and the home bias was    
explored in the empirical papers by Kang and Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist and 
Robertsson (2001). These two papers limited their analysis to a single, non-U.S. 
country, and showed that a stock’s visibility might especially be important in such 
markets that initially did not have a strong existing foreign investor presence.  
 
Kang and Stulz (1997) effectively followed the analysis by Merton (1987) and 
investigated the correlation between a firm’s market value and foreign ownership 
in that firm, as well as the assumption that foreign investment was higher in   
larger-sized firms that were more familiar to investors. Using firm-specific data 
for Japan, firms of considerable size were commonly shown to have both higher   
export ratios and higher turnover numbers – characteristics which made them 
more likely to be well known among international investors. Larger firms were 
also reported to be more inclined to engage in ADR programs, thus foreign       
investors were facing fewer obstacles when investing in those firms and were 
more willing to consider them in their investment choices.  
Overall, stock ownership in Japanese firms by foreigners was confirmed to be 
strongly biased against small firms, with investors disproportionately investing 
more in larger firms. Kang and Stulz called this observation the size bias.30 On 
average, foreign investors were shown to hold 6.97 percent of the equity of larger 
firms, but only 1.21 percent of the equity of smaller ones. As such, these results 
documented a sizable preference that could be directly linked to information 
asymmetries.31 
 
                                                 
30 Firms are generally considered large as measured by their total assets, the market value of  
common stocks, the number of employees, or otherwise as defined by their market capitalization. 
31 Huang and Shiu (2009) found similar foreign investor preferences in an emerging market   
(Taiwan), where foreign institutional investment was equally shown to be concentrated in large 
firms and in firms that were export-oriented. See also Kho, Stulz and Warnock (2009) for evidence 
on foreign ownership in Korea. 
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Similarly, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) presented a significant foreign owner-
ship preference for large firms in the country of Sweden. In their study, they were 
able to substantiate further firm visibility attributes that could be linked to foreign 
holdings (in addition to firm size), such as a firm’s market liquidity or exporting 
firms’ presence in international markets (as measured by foreign sales), or the 
cross-listing on an international stock exchange. The strong evidence of investors’ 
preference for more liquid stocks, for firms with large export numbers, and for 
firms that were listed abroad seemed to underline the assumption that information 
asymmetries were very important in determining the biases in foreign holdings.32 
 
Later on, additional support in favor of Merton’s investor recognition hypothesis 
was also provided by a host of studies that would focus on investors’ holdings 
across different countries (instead of on investors’ holdings in a single country). 
Kaniel, Li and Starks (2003), for example, used data from multiple developed   
and emerging market countries, and equally found their results to be consistent 
with the earlier empirical papers on the effect of stock visibility characteristics  
(including the size of a company) as being a key determinant of investors’       
allocation decisions. Similar findings by Aggerwal, Klapper and Wysocki (2005) 
also positively related higher foreign investment by U.S. mutual funds in various 
emerging markets to greater firm size and general firm visibility. For example, a 
doubling in firm size (as measured by total assets) was shown to lead to an       
approximate 0.12 percent increase in the investment by the funds in that firm.  
Edison and Warnock (2004) used the comprehensive data from the U.S. bench-
mark surveys from 1994 and 1997 in order to analyze the U.S. portfolio invest-
ment in nine large emerging countries, and were able to show a positive bilateral 
relationship between U.S. ownership and firm size, where investors would first 
choose to invest in emerging markets and then, given country allocations, to select 
certain stocks according to size characteristics, thereby confirming the size bias.33 
                                                 
32 Cai and Warnock (2004) equally showed a preference for large firms with high foreign sales and 
with an international presence. 
33 The sample included the emerging countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. 
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Overall, these empirical results regarding the preference of foreign investors for 
more visible stocks are very much emblematic of information asymmetries that 
may indeed be the driving force behind the biases in foreigners’ holdings. If    
investors do in fact underweight smaller firms that are less visible to them, this 
may well be a response to the severe information asymmetries associated with 
such firms. The preference for large firms can so be seen as a proxy for firm 
recognition, as consistent with Merton (1987).  
4.1.1.2 International Cross-Listing  
A special factor within the information environment of a company is its decision 
to list its securities for trading on the local stock exchange as well as on stock 
exchanges in other, foreign countries. Cross-border listing on a foreign exchange 
may well be very significant for reducing barriers to investment, especially    
those that might arise from a lack of information about the firm. Cross-listing  
effectively helps improve access to information about the company and its stock 
and, as a result, lowers the costs of acquiring information for foreign investors. 
Also, cross-listing will require companies to adopt and adhere to additional     
regulatory requirements and to possibly higher disclosure standards, which means 
that potential investors will also be provided with higher-quality information 
about the company. This is especially the case whenever a foreign company    
decides to list its securities in the U.S., either directly as an ordinary share or   
indirectly in the form of an ADR.  Since the U.S. equity market can commonly be  
regarded to feature more transparency, better governance, and greater shareholder 
rights’ protection when compared to most other countries, it is thus considered 
highly attractive for outside investors.34 By listing as an ordinary share, a foreign 
firm must effectively meet all the same requirements as a U.S. firm, which conse-
quently increases its appeal to investors by offering higher-quality and more    
reliable financial information.35 
                                                 
34 Indeed, most cross-listing has been heavily directed towards U.S. exchanges, particularly by 
European companies that are larger in size and export-oriented, as shown in Pagano, Roell and 
Zechner (2002). 
35 For example, firms will have to comply with SEC disclosure requirements, supervision and      
enforcement, and to reconcile their accounts with U.S. GAAP standards.  
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Listing on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) also has an equivalently potent   
impact as a U.S. listing, especially for firms in Europe.36 Issuing securities in the 
U.S. or listing on the LSE appears to not only provide increased liquidity for 
firms, but such listings may also capture some name recognition effect that helps 
reduce information costs for investors. Overall, public firms that cross-list in    
another country will benefit from an increased visibility to foreign investors, and 
especially so firms that are larger in size and export-oriented, i.e. firms investors 
are already familiar with. 
 
The cross-listing effect on investment decisions has been examined in a variety of   
empirical studies. Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004), for example, indicated 
that the effect of a U.S. listing did indeed have a significantly positive impact not 
only on the level of foreign equities in U.S. investors’ portfolios, but also on the 
reduction of information asymmetries. One of the primary benefits of cross-listing 
was shown to be that it allowed foreign firms to experience a significant increase 
in U.S. shareholdings and to attract a larger base of investors. Cross-listed firms 
were able to enhance their appeal to U.S. investors and could even expect higher 
firm valuations following a cross-listing as a direct result of their greater visibility 
and the adopted higher-quality information standards.37  
The regression analysis in this paper also clearly confirmed a strong negative  
relationship between a U.S. listing and the home bias, with countries that were  
not publicly listed in the U.S. shown to be more underweighted in U.S. investors’ 
equity portfolios. More interestingly, the paper also provided evidence that the 
overall U.S. home bias could be expected to fall from a measure of 80 percent to 
about 50 percent if all foreign companies were publicly listed on U.S. exchanges, 
which was a highly significant result. 
                                                 
36 See evidence by Bertaut and Kole (2004). 
37 Evidence that cross-listed firms have higher value was also examined in Doidge, Karolyi and 
Stulz (2004), for example. 
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Particularly striking were also the results found in Edison and Warnock (2004). In 
that paper, U.S. investors’ holdings of emerging market equities that were cross-
listed in the U.S. as ADRs were not only affirmed to be almost four times greater 
than the holdings of non-cross-listed firms, but the holdings were even shown     
to be in accordance with the numbers as predicted by the ICAPM, i.e. incorpo-
rated   in U.S. portfolios at full weights. Also another study by Aggarwal, Klapper 
and Wysocki (2005) confirmed that an ADR issuance and listing on an U.S. stock  
exchange by firms from emerging markets did lead to significantly greater in-
vestment allocations by U.S. mutual funds towards those countries. 
 
Ammer, Holland, Smith and Warnock (2012) explored the willingness of U.S. 
investors to purchase outside, cross-listed equity on a U.S. exchange (either     
directly listed or as ADRs) by using the U.S. benchmark survey as of year-end 
1997. The dataset included 12,221 non-U.S. firms from 46 countries, of which 
498 were cross-listed in the U.S.. In summary, median U.S. investment in the  
outstanding shares of a cross-listed foreign firm was shown to be about 13.6    
percent of the firm’s total market capitalization, whereas non-cross-listed foreign 
firms only had roughly 3 percent of U.S. stock ownership. It was also reported 
that while more than one quarter of non-cross-listed firms in the sample were   
attracting no U.S. investment at all, cross-listed firms, on the other hand, were 
able to roughly double U.S. holdings in their stocks - an important result revealing 
investors’ clear preference and interest for cross-listed foreign equity (as evident 
in their country allocations).38 Ammer et al. hence concluded that cross-listing 
was the single most important determinant of U.S. investment in the equity of a 
foreign firm, and its effect alone was shown to account for about 25 to 35 percent 
of total U.S. foreign portfolio holdings (even though only 4 percent of foreign 
firms were shown to be cross-listed in the U.S.).39  
                                                 
38 See also Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2003) for further evidence. 
39 The study also revealed that firms were more likely to cross-list in the U.S. if they were larger   
in size, had better accounting standards at home, or were domiciled in Canada. 
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Finally, it should be noted that the effects of a foreign listing by U.S. firms on the 
investment decisions of non-U.S. investors has also been investigated, namely by 
Ke, Ng and Wang (2010). It was shown that the foreign listing itself had no     
particular impact on investors’ portfolio choices if the U.S. firm already had a 
significant local presence within that certain country. The authors presumed that 
this was particularly due to the fact that since U.S. firms were already commonly 
associated with higher corporate governance and accounting standards even    
before the cross-listing, investors would not gain any additional benefits from 
those firms being listed in their country other than the benefits that had also been 
previously available to them.  
 
Overall, the findings of much smaller under-weights of cross-listed firms clearly 
underline the importance and implications of international cross-listings for the 
home bias phenomenon. Investors were shown not only to be more inclined to 
hold equities of more visible and larger firms, but all these empirical results also 
proved that information asymmetries did indeed play a central role in explaining 
the equity home bias puzzle (as consistent with previous studies by Kang and 
Stulz (1997) and by Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001)). Investors’ general aver-
sion to firms that were not cross-listed could at least partially explain the bias, 
while cross-listed firms were overwhelmingly shown to successfully alleviate in-
vestors’ information asymmetries. 
4.1.2 The Effect of Corporate Governance Factors 
In general, the term corporate governance is broadly used as a way to describe the 
various mechanisms and rules under which a company is operating in a market, 
and normally refers to the prudential regulations in a country, the supervision of 
financial markets, effective market discipline, or the leadership of a corporation. 
In the finance literature, the empirical investigation on corporate governance   
issues points to the substantial influence of the various forms of investor protec-
tion on international portfolio investment. If, for example, a country sustains only 
a weak environment for investors in terms of the degree of government interven-
tion (market regulation), then this will also adversely affect the decisions by for-
eigners to invest in that country. 
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On the firm-level, investor protection regulations might also help determine       
the credibility of the financial information published by firm, and information 
asymmetries might arise from differences in regulatory and disclosure require-
ments across countries. Recent governance research has documented both firm-
specific internal and country-specific external corporate governance mechanisms 
that can be distinguished, both of which are important for understanding inves-
tors’ portfolio decisions.40  
4.1.2.1 Country-level Corporate Governance 
The extent of country-level (national) corporate governance policies such as 
strong shareholder rights, the strength of the legal system and judicial efficiency 
(the rule of law) can be associated with direct investor protection through the   
enforcement of these laws and the legislative supervision of the financial market. 
Although these are not directly incomplete-information issues, the existence of 
poor investing laws or other regulatory constraints can substantially restrain    
foreign investment in a country.  
The studies by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silvanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998, 2000), 
for instance, showed evidence that strong investor protection laws and the        
enforcement of these laws would lead to greater financial and capital market    
development, while Ahaerne et al. (2004) reported that in particular the enforce-
ment of the laws was as important as the mere existence of the laws itself.41 
Aggerwal, Klapper and Wysocki (2005) provided evidence that the existence of 
country-level discretionary policies such as strong shareholder rights and legal 
institutions in emerging markets would lead to greater investment by U.S. mutual 
funds towards those countries, for example. Also Thapa and Poshakwale (2012) 
documented that foreign investment was larger towards those countries that were 
more liquid, exhibited a higher degree of market efficiency, and had lower trading 
costs. Such stock market development factors were shown to play an important 
role in foreign investment decisions, and could explain almost 54 percent of the 
total variation in foreign equity allocations.  
                                                 
40 See Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2010), for example. 
41 For example, in the U.S. the SEC reviews filings on a systematic basis and regularly imposes 
effective sanctions, while other government bodies can be assumed to be less strict. 
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4.1.2.2 Firm-level Corporate Governance 
Firm-level corporate governance generally refers to a company’s ownership and 
control structure. In relation to the home bias phenomenon, two important aspects 
can be distinguished that potentially help determine investment preferences.  
The first aspect considers the information asymmetry viewpoint regarding the 
quality of financial information that is published by companies, both in terms of 
accountability and credibility. Higher quality of financial information is seen as  
an important factor within the firm’s information environment, and is frequently 
associated with the adoption of internationally-recognized accounting standards or 
the use of consolidated statements, for example.42  
Many do regard the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) as 
the highest financial reporting standards in the world, and adherence to U.S. 
GAAP can consistently be related to better disclosure patterns and more transpar-
ency.43 In a prominent empirical study, Bradshaw, Bushee and Miller (2004) were 
able to directly relate the choice of accounting method by foreign firms to U.S. 
investors’ portfolio decisions, and indeed confirmed that the degree of conformity 
with U.S. GAAP was an incremental factor for mitigating the home bias and for 
attracting international capital. Overall, the level of U.S. institutional ownership 
was shown to be significantly and positively higher in those non-U.S. firms that 
demonstrated U.S. GAAP conformity, as investors would strongly prefer higher 
quality financial information and overweight those firms in their portfolios. The 
study thus presented information asymmetries as being at least partially due to the     
financial reporting method adopted by a firm, while much of the previous research 
rather attributed informational issues to a lack of knowledge that the firm actually      
existed, as seen earlier. Instead, the credibility of a firm’s financial information 
was shown to be as important as the visibility of the firm, and investors’ aversion 
to firms with expected corporate governance problems could at least equally well 
explain the home bias. 
                                                 
42 Ammer et al. (2012), for example, showed that U.S. investors strongly preferred such firms that 
maintained higher quality accounting standards, in addition to larger firms and firms that were 
members of the MSCI World Index (among firms that were not cross-listed in the U.S.). 
43 See, for example, Aggerwal, Klapper and Wysocki (2005). 
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Research also showed that the adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) would lead to increased foreign equity investment, as evidenced 
more recently in Khurana and Michas (2011) and Shima and Gordon (2011),     
for example. Somewhat mixed results, however, were earlier published by 
Beneish and Yohn (2008), who predicted that a company’s decision to adhere to 
IFRS would influence investors either by reducing their so-called information 
processing costs (like the costs of analyzing and becoming familiar with foreign 
financial statements, or the costs of interpreting information and comparing      
financial information across companies), or by reducing uncertainty regarding   
the quality of financial reporting, especially since IFRS could be considered 
equivalent to U.S. GAAP in terms of the reliability of financial information     
provided. However, it was also shown that while accounting factors were im-
portant, when compared to other determining factors of the home bias (like inves-
tor protection in a country, or geographical proximity) the use of IFRS was not as 
effective. They therefore concluded that global IFRS adoption alone was unlikely 
to further reduce the observed home bias. 
 
The second aspect of firm-level governance issues then concerns the existence of 
so-called controlling shareholders in companies, frequently located in countries 
with weaker corporate governance policies. Insider or controlling shareholder 
structures limit foreign investment especially since that fraction of shares will not 
be available for free market trading, and outside investors will only be able to 
purchase those remaining shares not currently held by the controlling sharehold-
ers.44Also, those shareholders might hold an informational advantage over outside 
investors by having, for example, access to more timely and private information 
about the company; as such, especially smaller corporations are often controlled 
by a number of larger shareholders, who might be able to extract for themselves 
private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.  
                                                 
44 If, for example, such shareholders owned more than 51 percent of a firm, only 49 percent of 
shares would effectively be available to other (foreign) portfolio investors, suggesting a rather 
restricted shareholder base. In general, controlling shareholders are classified as those holding 
more than 5 percent of a firm’s outstanding shares. 
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Thus, in countries where controlling shareholders are economically important the 
prevalence of closely-held firms might help explain why foreign investors do   
underweight these firms and countries in their portfolios. It should therefore also 
be possible to link the size of the home bias to this corporate governance issue. 
 
The study by Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2003) found evidence 
that the existence of controlling shareholders indeed helped explain the foreign 
equity holdings of U.S. investors. For constructing a measure of the home bias, 
the authors suggested that the shares held by controlling shareholders who owned 
more than 5 percent of a firm’s outstanding shares should not be included in the 
world market portfolio and, instead, they created estimates of the float of shares 
(as a fraction of the market’s total capitalization) freely available to all investors 
in the market. The float of shares was so defined as one minus the share of    
closely-held shares not available for trading in the open market, which thus     
represented an upper-bound limit for foreign ownership. For example, 7.94      
percent of shares were shown to be closely-held in the U.S., while in the U.K. that 
fraction was 9.93 percent. However, except for the U.S., the U.K., Ireland and Sri 
Lanka, all other countries in the sample had a fraction of closely-held shares that 
was more than 20 percent on average (for Austria, that fraction was 54.85        
percent).45 In terms of the home bias, it was assumed that controlling (or insider) 
ownership would primarily influence the existence of a bias through its direct   
effect on the fraction of outstanding shares available to foreign investors. Indeed, 
when the portion of closely-held shares was taken into account, the home bias as 
traditionally measured could be shown to be much smaller than previously 
thought: while the average measure in the paper by Ahearne et al. (2004) had been 
81 percent, the average measure of home bias when accounting for closely-held 
shares was only 33 percent, as there would be less investment towards those  
countries where the fraction of controlling shareholders was large. As such, the 
size of the home bias could so be intricately linked to a corporate governance  
issue. 
                                                 
45 It was interesting to see that the U.S. and the U.K., both of which had the lowest controlling 
ownership share, were also the most developed capital markets in the sample.  
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Similarly, Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2010) examined U.S. investors’ holdings of 
non-U.S. equities of firms from 29 countries from across Europe, Asia and Latin 
America, as of year-end of 1997. They also showed that the presence of high   
levels of managerial or family control at the firm level would dissuade foreign 
equity investors from investing in such firms, and especially whenever those firms 
were also located in emerging countries with generally poor disclosure policies 
and weaker corporate governance systems. In contrast, an increase in governance 
problems and private control benefits was shown to also directly lead to a de-
crease in U.S. investment.  
 
For Swedish firms, Giannetti and Simonov (2006) showed that a marginal in-
crease in poor corporate governance that made it easier for insiders to extract pri-
vate (monetary) benefits for themselves would decrease the probability of foreign 
investors’ willingness to hold stocks of such a firm by 1.37 percentage points, 
which again suggested that investors did indeed take corporate governance into 
account when investing abroad. 
 
Finally, Kho, Stulz and Warnock (2009) focused on aggregate country insider 
ownership, and directly asked how ownership concentration was connected to the 
home bias phenomenon. While they found no remarkable evidence of a systematic 
decrease in the insider ownership across the 42 countries in the sample over the 
period 1994 to 2004, however, they showed that a change in investors’ stock  
preferences was also critically dependent on a change in insider ownership within 
a certain country. In countries where the insider ownership level had at least 
somewhat decreased over the sample period, the U.S. home bias towards those 
countries was shown to have also decreased. Moreover, a country’s governance 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law were equally shown to be signif-
icantly negatively related to home bias, and to be a determining factor in inves-
tors’ allocation decisions. 
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4.2 Local Bias 
So far, the various aspects of asymmetric information between domestic and    
foreign investors have successfully been shown to be some of the fundamental 
factors that can at least partially explain the home bias phenomenon. As will be 
seen, however, the information asymmetry argument can also be related to an 
analysis of the home bias within a more domestic context rather than across coun-
tries, where investors’ preference for geographically proximate companies and 
local stocks is considered an equally important aspect of portfolio choice. Under 
the assumption that portfolio diversification is also strongly determined by the 
geographical location in which the investor lives, it is generally assumed that local 
investors might also find themselves at a substantial informational advantage   
relative to their foreign counterparts.46  
 
Given their geographical proximity, local investors might possibly have easier 
access to more accurate or even private information about local companies than 
about more distant ones, as suggested in Coval and Moskowitz (2001): “Investors 
located near a firm can visit the firm’s operations, talk to suppliers and employ-
ees, as well as assess the local market conditions in which the firm operates.”47 In 
other words, they may simply feel more comfortable about investing in companies 
that are located near them than they would feel about investing in other, more  
distant companies located in foreign countries. 
 
                                                 
46 According to Feng and Seasholes (2004) three important terms can be distinguished in order to 
describe investors’ geographic location bias. The first aspect refers to investors’ tendency to over-
weight the stocks of firms with headquarters near where the investor lives, which they called pure 
home bias. The second example represents investors’ preference for firms that are listed on a stock 
exchange located near the investor, also called location of trade bias. Yet another preference is the 
cultural affinity bias, where investors are shown to prefer to invest in firms with headquarters near 
where the investor was born. 
47 Coval and Moskowitz (2001), p. 839. 
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The existing literature on portfolio investment tried to accommodate both the 
question of whether or not a local bias among investors could be shown to exist 
empirically, and whether or not local investors might indeed be able to perform 
better than foreign investors (as would be implied by the information asymmetry 
theory). In this sense, most explanations associated with a preference for geo-
graphically proximate companies focused either on the information asymmetries 
hypothesis or on the familiarity hypothesis, which postulates that investors poten-
tially have a psychological desire to invest in their local community or home 
country that they are more familiar with.  
In the following, the evidence on the local bias from an informational viewpoint 
will be discussed in more detail, whereas the familiarity hypothesis will then be 
explored as a behavioral theory in chapter 4.3.4. The importance of investors’ 
tendency towards geographically more proximate investment opportunities is also 
further investigated in order to discuss how much of the home bias phenomenon 
can truly be considered an international puzzle. If the preference to invest in local 
stocks can be shown to be strongly related to the home bias, then the local bias as 
such should also allow for a better clarification of the home bias phenomenon 
itself. 
4.2.1 Empirical Evidence on the Local Bias 
The first attempt to uncover the effect of distance on investment decisions was 
presented in the paper by Coval and Moskowitz (1999), who were able to success-
fully document the economic significance of geographic proximity within the  
domestic setting (country). The authors specifically studied the degree of local 
equity preference among U.S. mutual fund managers in their investments towards 
U.S.-headquartered companies. For the year 1995, their sample of over a thousand 
investment managers revealed that nearly one in every ten companies was chosen 
because of it was located within the same city as the manager, and the average 
fund manager was shown to invest in companies that were between 160 to 184 
kilometers (or 9.32 to 11.20 percent) closer geographically than other comparable 
companies the manager could have held as well.  
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Their subsequent study (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001) not only confirmed these 
earlier results, but also presented an extended analysis spanning over a longer  
period of 20 years, from year-end of 1974 until year-end of 1994. Over that time 
period, U.S. mutual fund managers were equally shown to prefer to invest in 
stocks that were on average 14 percent closer to them than other available invest-
ments in the market, which was an even stronger result when compared to their 
earlier paper in 1999. Fund managers would significantly tilt their portfolios    
towards local stocks, with about 7.12 percent of their total assets invested locally. 
That was both a statistically and an economically significant result, and success-
fully demonstrated a persistent and high local bias among institutional investors. 
 
Further, an even stronger geographical preference was shown to be pursued by 
individual investors. First, Zhu (2002) provided evidence of a significant bias in 
his examination on the investment activity of 27,189 U.S. individual household 
investors. During the period from January 1991 to November 1996, investors’ 
portfolio shares were on average allocated towards those companies that were 
between 12.42 and 14.65 percent closer to their home residence than other stocks 
available in the market, which was an even higher local bias than had previously 
been indicated in Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001). Also Ivkovich and 
Weisbenner (2005) provided similar results of a disproportionate preference for 
local stocks among U.S. household portfolios, for an equal sample period from 
1991 to 1996. Investments in companies headquartered within 100 kilometers of 
the investor were considered locally-biased and, on average, the local fraction of 
overall household portfolio investment was shown to be around 20 percent – 
which again was a higher result than the average local share of only 7 percent in 
mutual fund portfolios reported in Coval and Moskowitz (2001), and confirmed 
the existence of a particularly strong local bias among private investors. 
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A third, more international paper by Feng and Seasholes (2004) investigated the 
portfolio composition of a large number of individual brokerage accounts in   
mainland China, as of June 2001.48 They showed that, on average, 19.53 percent 
of investors’ portfolio holdings were allocated towards locally headquartered 
companies that were situated within the same region where investors currently 
lived. A preference for locally listed stocks was shown to be even stronger, with        
investors holding 83.68 percent of their wealth in such stocks that were traded on 
a main (local) stock exchange (location of trade bias). Both of these results were 
statistically and economically significant. The authors reasoned that individual 
investors particularly chose such (local) stocks that were associated with lower 
searching costs or, equivalently, with lower costs of acquiring information on the 
stock.49 More recently, Seasholes and Zhu (2010) showed that individual inves-
tors did overweigh and hold as much as 30 percent of their portfolio in local 
stocks whose headquarter was within a 250 mile radius of where the investor 
lived. Here, the final sample included 43,132 household investments at a large 
U.S. discount   broker over a period from January 1991 to November 1996.  
 
Given the strong empirical evidence of investors’ bias towards local investments 
(especially among individual investors) the common view regarding international 
portfolio investment nowadays assumes that domestic investors generally also 
might have better access to local (private) information about geographically closer 
companies in their home market that is not available to foreign investors. Accord-
ingly, geographic proximity can also be used as a measure of how well informed 
investors potentially are about investments, and of how much an informational 
advantage they potentially have from owning local stocks. Thus, if local investors 
indeed have an informational advantage, this should be evident in the returns of 
their portfolios as well. 
                                                 
48 Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan were not included in the study for political and legal reasons. 
49Another international study examining individual investors’ preference for locally-headquartered 
companies was also presented by Bodnaruk (2009), who showed that in Sweden the average geo-
graphical distance from an investor’s residence to the closest establishment of the company he/she 
was investing in was only 145 kilometers. 
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4.2.2  Local Bias and Information Asymmetries 
In the empirical literature, the simple proposition that investors are holding more 
value-relevant information about local companies than about remote companies 
has been directly examined in terms of the performance of local investments when 
compared to other investments, i.e. in terms of investment profitability. It was 
assumed that whenever investors would succeed in collecting locally available 
information that was value-relevant, that would also give them an informational 
advantage over other investors.  
Coval and Moskowitz (1999), for instance, showed that U.S. fund managers’   
returns performance from investing locally was a substantial 2.7 percent higher 
when compared to non-local investments (for the sample year of 1995). Also the 
authors’ subsequent paper of 2001 showed that locally-held equities had gained an 
average additional 2.5 percent annual return relative to the rest of the portfolio 
that was invested in more distant stocks.50 They reasoned that the better perfor-
mance of local holdings not only indicated that local fund managers were indeed 
better informed about local stocks, but also that they effectively had a meaningful 
advantage in evaluating local stocks over the rest of the market. 51  
Evidence by Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2005) highlighted that value-relevant  
local information was not only collected by institutional investors but also by  
individual (household) investors, who would equally exploit their local advantage 
in order to earn higher returns from their investments. The paper showed that U.S. 
individual investors were able to earn on average a 3.7 percent excess return on 
their local investment when compared to other investments (over the one-year 
sample horizon of 1991). However, the results were even more pronounced when 
a 100-kilometer radius instead of 250 kilometers was used to define the stocks of 
firms (within that threshold) as local holdings. Over the sample time frame, inves-
tors would have gained an even higher abnormal return of 4.8 percent from invest-
ing locally. 
                                                 
50 Coval and Moskowitz defined all the holdings that were 95 percent closer to portfolio managers 
than the average firm in the market as the local portion of the portfolio. 
51 See also the studies by Malloy (2005) and Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008) for further evidence on 
local analysts’ information advantage. 
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Shukla and van Inwegen (1995) based their results on a performance comparison 
between U.S. open-end mutual funds and U.K. unit trusts that were both investing 
primarily in the U.S. security market over a 12-year sample period (from June 
1981 to May 1993). Over that time, U.S. fund managers were shown to clearly 
benefit from a location bias in their investment decisions, as they were able to 
consistently out-perform their U.K. colleagues with higher average mean returns. 
This led the authors to conclude that a lack of access to local knowledge and local 
contacts with other market participants did contribute at least to some extent to the 
inferior performance of U.K. managers. Over the full sample period, 38.89 per-
cent of U.S. funds were able to show greater mean returns than a comparable per-
formance benchmark (the S&P 500 index) would have achieved, whereas only 
5.56 percent of U.K. funds had achieved higher mean returns.  
 
Another paper by Hau (2001) documented an information advantage among    
professional investors (traders) located close to the corporate headquarters of  
traded stocks in Germany. Over a four-month period from August to December 
1998, more proximately situated traders were shown to out-perform both foreign 
as well as other non-local German traders. Again, local proximity to stocks 
seemed to provide significant information advantages for investors, even though 
here those advantages appeared to be only of short-term nature and to be rather 
based on insider information (like information received immediately prior to    
public announcements by a company).  
 
For Korea, Choe, Kho and Stulz (2001) showed an information advantage from 
the access to private information among domestic investors over foreign institu-
tional investors, while Kim (2002), equally examining the difference in perfor-
mance between local and foreign investors holding stocks in Korean firms, 
showed that the effect of information asymmetries was most pronounced when 
investments in smaller firms were taken into account, where local investors’     
advantage was assumed to be strongest. Between 1996 and 2003, local investors 
were able to outperform the benchmark portfolio by 60 to 70 basis points, while 
foreign investors were shown to under-perform by 10 basis points. 
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Dvorák (2005) also yielded similar results by studying local investments in Indo-
nesia, even though the informational asymmetries between foreign and domestic 
investors were reported to be less severe than those reported in Choe, Kho and 
Stulz (2001). In Feng and Seasholes (2004) the local portion of investors’ portfo-
lios in China was shown to outperform the more distant share by approximately 
62 basis points per year, which was also a statistically significant result.  
 
Additional evidence was also provided for Sweden in the study by Bodnaruk 
(2009). The paper examined the performance of local investments from a different 
angle than previous studies had, that is when investors were changing their place 
of residence and were moving to another location, thereby also changing their 
proximity to the stocks they were originally investing in (before the move). Under 
the information-based assumption that such a change in proximity would also  
affect the availability of the information investors might initially have derived 
from being (geographically) close to the stock, their relocation of residence was 
assumed to also influence the composition of their stock portfolios afterwards. 
Indeed, the author showed that over a two-and-a-half year period after the move 
investors would sell about 3.27 percent more of their originally held local stocks 
than non-movers would.  
Further, the results also indicated that investors were then achieving higher returns 
on new stock purchases than on the holdings of their original stocks, which again 
was in line with the assumption that investors had familiarized themselves with a 
new set of local companies after the move due to more information available to 
them. After the move, information on previously closer stocks was harder to    
obtain, and investors would move on to stocks that were again more proximate to 
them in their new place of residence. As such, their investment choice was seen as 
more driven by the availability of information on a stock than by other factors, a 
result which would, again, lend substantial support to the information asymmetry      
hypothesis.52 
 
                                                 
52 These results were also consistent with Massa and Simonov (2006). 
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Finally, the paper by Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008) conducted a much broader study 
and examined the performance of local and foreign analysts from a host of 32 
countries around the world, over the period from 2001 to 2003. They showed that 
local analysts situated in the same country as a firm whose stocks they were cov-
ering were more adept at giving more accurate earnings forecasts than foreign 
investors, whose earnings predictions turned out to be not as precise. For the   
majority of 26 countries local analysts’ advantage was confirmed to be positive, 
and to be even significantly positive in 10 out of the 32 countries. 
4.2.3 Concluding Remarks 
Overall, the inferences that can be drawn from the aforementioned papers conclu-
sively point to a pronounced geographic preference for proximate firms, and to a 
significant informational advantage that local investors potentially have over for-
eign investors by choosing not to venture abroad. The more interesting question 
now would be whether the evidence of a local bias can also help explain the inter-
national home bias phenomenon, and whether it is possible to determine how 
much of the home bias can truly be considered an international puzzle. If the 
preference to invest in local stocks is also strongly related to the home bias, then 
the local bias should allow for a better definition of the international home bias as 
well. One would expect, for example, that investors with a strong local bias would 
also generally prefer to invest more at home than abroad.  
 
In the study by Coval and Moskowitz (1999) measures of geographical distance 
were considered in order to determine how much of the home bias could actually 
be explained for by a local bias. In an effort to extrapolate the domestic distances 
(from their earlier results) to international scales, distance-adjusted portfolio 
weights were compared to the weights of several major markets in the world port-
folio. It was thus shown, most interestingly, that distance might account for as 
much as one-third of the observed home bias in U.S. portfolios, which means that 
as much of investors’ home bias could be explained for by the local bias. In other 
words, geographic proximity did not only play a central role in domestic alloca-
tions, furthermore about one-third of the home bias puzzle should not be consid-
ered an international puzzle after all, but rather a local-bias puzzle.  
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It was also shown that the domestic local bias and the international bias could well   
be expected to be correlated with each other. Building on and supporting this  
hypothesis, Zhu (2002) found that investors holding foreign securities in their 
portfolios did indeed exhibit a significantly smaller local bias in comparison to 
other investors who were not holding foreign assets. Both local and home country 
bias seemed to be a function of the same underlying factors, and investors who 
were more inclined to invest in foreign stocks were also shown to be more likely 
to invest in more remote companies.53  
 
It can thus be reasoned that existing home bias evidence and findings might have 
to be re-interpreted as being significantly related to the stronger preference for 
more proximately located companies rather than for companies located further 
away or even in another country. In summary, understanding investors’ biases 
within a domestic setting might therefore be just as important as trying to explain 
investors’ home country bias itself and, as such, this aspect should be taken into 
consideration as well when analyzing the home bias phenomenon.  
 
However, it should also be noted that the theory of information asymmetry cannot 
be seen as a unifying explanation and as not enough to explain the phenomenon 
all by itself.54 It is also worthwhile to consider that much of the analysis on infor-
mation asymmetries assumes investor rationality, while recent studies suggest that 
behavioral factors might also be at play in inducing a home bias in portfolio deci-
sions. These factors will now be explored in more detail.  
                                                 
53 Especially more sophisticated investors (as defined by their higher incomes or by their profes-
sion) were shown to be more likely to invest both abroad and in more distant firms. 
54 Bravo-Ortega (2003) and Jeske (2001) also came to this conclusion. 
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4.3 Investor Behavior 
Since the early studies by Markowitz (1952, 1959) and Tobin (1958) the wide-
spread diffusion of the classic portfolio model has lead to a generic acceptance of 
the fundamental aspects of this approach, which postulate that investors base their 
portfolio investment decisions, ceteris paribus, only on the mean and variance of 
the expected returns according to their general risk aversion.  
 
More recently, however, it has also been argued that this approach has so far 
largely ignored investors’ actual behavior, beliefs, or otherwise biases of judg-
ment regarding their investment decisions. In this context, the empirical literature 
has increasingly begun to shift towards relaxing many of the traditional assump-
tions of the classic portfolio model in order to allow for a wider set of determi-
nants that would take into account not just the mean and variance of expected  
returns, but would also emphasize investor irrationality and behavior. Based on 
this understanding, the development of what is known as behavioral finance has 
been spurred at least since the 1990s, which by now is considered a vital research 
approach in academic finance.  
 
As the succeeding literature on behavioral finance was essentially trying to bridge 
the gap between the normative models and the real behavior of investors, it  
thereby followed a much broader perspective by incorporating psychology and 
sociology into the standard models of finance, focusing on observable (and very  
human) departures from rational behavior based on the assumptions found in    
psychological research or common sense. Overall, this has lead not only to a   
profound deepening of knowledge about international financial markets but,   
more importantly, also to a better understanding of the home bias phenomenon 
itself. 
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As will be shown in the following, empirical behavioral finance studies have 
clearly confirmed earlier intuition that in many circumstances investors’ behavior 
is quite different from the rationality hypothesis of the classic finance theory. 
Theories of investor preferences or investor overconfidence, for example, have 
been put forth to explain investors’ choice of under-diversification. Investors’ 
familiarity with companies, their overly optimistic performance predictions re-
garding the returns of domestic firms, or subjective competence have all been dis-
cussed as possible explanations that determine investors’ portfolio decision. In 
addition, investors’ loyalty towards a certain company, for example, might also 
make it difficult for them to hold an independent view on the expected returns 
from that company’s stock, thereby affecting their investment decisions.  
 
These behavioral approaches can all claim substantial empirical validation, and all 
of these theories have successfully been related to the home bias phenomenon in a 
number of papers. The main results from the behavioral literature have led to im-
portant new insights on the home bias phenomenon which, in summary, seems to 
be influenced by a wider number of factors than has previously been assumed. 
4.3.1 Relative Optimism 
Commonly perceived as the basic alternative explanation to the theory of infor-
mation asymmetries, the behavioral approach of relative optimism has been ini-
tially suggested for explaining the under-diversification in international portfolios. 
It is also being referred to as optimism bias. 
 
French and Poterba (1991) were the first to claim that if investors were simply 
more optimistic about the expected equity returns from their home market than 
about returns from foreign markets, then the observed home bias could be consid-
ered a direct implication of investors’ behavior in forming expectations. They 
reasoned that whenever investors were regarding their domestic market as being 
relatively better compared to other (foreign) countries, these optimistic investors 
were in fact having trouble evaluating their home country in an objective, un-
biased way.  
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French and Poterba suggested that in order for the observed home bias in portfolio 
holdings to be rationalized and comprehensible, investors would have to be     
assumed to hold substantial optimistic expectations about their domestic market 
and, at the same time, pessimistic expectations about foreign markets. In an effort 
to document this hypothesis, they compared the expected returns from six major 
capital markets that would explain investors’ actual (heavily domestically biased) 
portfolio holdings to the returns that could be expected from holding an optimally 
diversified portfolio (with country weights proportional to the country’s share of 
market capitalization in the world market), and were able to show clear differ-
ences in expectations: U.S. investors, for example, valued and perceived the ex-
pected returns from their home market allocations to be 90 basis points above 
those implied by an optimally diversified portfolio (the benchmark); likewise, 
Japanese and British investors were shown to be even more optimistic and ex-
pected their domestic market returns to be 250 and over 400 basis points higher 
than the returns implied by an international value-weighted portfolio, respectively. 
The perceived relative advantage alone was therefore shown to be enough for  
investors to heavily overweight the domestic market in their portfolios.  
For the authors these results lead them to conclude that, first, investors clearly 
perceived and expected their domestic equity to perform relatively better than 
what the benchmark allocations would imply and, second, that the perceived   
advantage of the domestic equity over foreign equity may indeed be a driving 
force restraining international diversification; relative optimism was so success-
fully established as a reasonable and acceptable explanation of the home equity 
bias. 
 
Further seminal studies by Strong and Xu (2003), Luetje and Menkhoff (2007), 
and Graham, Harvey and Huang (2009) would later on complement the research 
efforts in this area. The authors of all of these papers suggested that investors not 
only perceived domestic stocks more favorably than foreign stocks, but also that 
they generally judged their home market more optimistically than financial mar-
kets in other regions of the world.  
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Strong and Xu (2003), for example, analyzed data from the Merrill Lynch month-
ly Fund Manager Survey from October 1995 to October 2000, and equally found a 
significant optimistic tendency towards the home market among fund managers 
from the U.S., the U.K., Continental Europe, and Japan. Overall, 52 percent of 
U.S. investors were shown to be on average more optimistic about domestic equi-
ties in the U.S. than about other (foreign) equities, while 66 percent of U.K. inves-
tors were on average relatively more optimistic about U.K. equities. The results 
were also similar for European and Japanese markets. Investors’ optimism about 
their home market thus had a significant effect on their portfolio allocations, and 
induced them to hold overly domestically-biased investments. 
Relative optimism was also shown to be statistically significant among fund man-
agers in Germany, in the paper by Luetje and Menkhoff (2007). Their examina-
tion of a questionnaire survey including responses from 234 German fund manag-
ers in 2003 revealed that higher performance forecasts and better expectations 
about the German market would lead them to invest more in their home country 
than in other countries. Indeed it was shown that the higher their expectations for 
the home market were, the higher would also consequently be their observed   
degree of home bias.  
 
Finally, Graham, Harvey and Huang (2009) were able to directly relate optimism 
to fewer foreign portfolio holdings, even though the immediate effect of optimism  
appeared to be quite small. Using data on overall household investment in the 
U.S. from the year 2002, it was shown that on average 72 percent of all investors 
were relatively more optimistic about the U.S. market than about other foreign 
markets, while only 37.5 percent of all investors were holding foreign assets in 
their portfolios. However, when the effect of optimism was estimated to be greater 
than its average value, only slightly fewer investors were prepared to invest inter-
nationally, namely 37.3 percent. In comparison, whenever investor optimism was 
shown to be less than its average value, a just slightly higher percentage of 37.7 of 
investors choose to invest in foreign assets. Thus, while relative optimism seemed 
to be an important contributing factor to investors’ home bias, the magnitude of its 
effects was too small to fully explain its cause. 
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4.3.2 Over-Confidence 
Over-confident investors can be characterized as those investors who feel more 
confident about home market investments than about foreign investments, thereby 
largely under-estimating domestic (local) risk.55 
Kilka and Weber (2000), for example, conducted an experimental study on the 
investment behavior of graduate students from both Germany and the U.S., and 
showed that each group of participants felt on average more confident about    
domestic stocks in their portfolios, as well as about making forecasts regarding 
their home market rather than foreign markets. Both groups foresaw higher re-
turns on the stocks they believed to know better and were in general more opti-
mistic about domestic stocks, which in turn translated into greater optimism about 
the distribution of domestic market returns, and lead to a greater home bias. 
Another paper by Pastor (2000) concluded that, in principle, investors’ home bias 
could be rationalized by the degree of that investor’s confidence about the home 
market, while Li (2004) even went as far as arguing that only strong domestic  
investor confidence would generate an under-investment in foreign equities. The 
paper also showed that investors held very strong beliefs about the associated 
higher risks and/or lower returns from foreign stocks.  
4.3.3 Lack of Self-Rated Competence 
The so-called competence effect can essentially be seen as a related concept to the 
over-confidence hypothesis as discussed in Barber and Odean (2001). Here it is 
argued that there are certain types of investors who feel especially skillful about 
their investment knowledge, and who also feel more competent about fully under-
standing the risks and benefits involved in investing in foreign markets.56 Inves-
tors with more competence thus not only feel that they are good at investing in 
general, but might feel they are in particular good at investing in foreign stocks 
and are more willing to invest accordingly. In contrast, however, this might also 
mean that whenever people feel less knowledgeable and less competent about 
their investment opportunities, they will only choose poorly and more likely avoid 
foreign countries in their investment decisions, and thus increase the home bias.  
                                                 
55 As indicated in Barber and Odean (2001). 
56 See Heath and Tversky (1991) for an illustration of the competence effect. 
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The study by Graham, Harvey and Huang (2009), for example, argued that the 
type of investor behavior that characterized less home bias was driven, at least in 
part, by the competence effect, and they stated: “It is likely that their educational 
background and other demographic characteristics make some investors feel more 
competent than others in understanding the array of financial information and  
opportunities available to them.”57 Using data from several UBS/Gallup Investor 
Surveys in the U.S. they found, for example, that male investors and investors 
with higher income and more education were also more likely to believe they 
were competent investors than female investors or those with less income and 
education were. As such, higher education and income were shown to not only 
make a person feel considerably more competent, but in turn these characteristics 
also led to higher perceived competence in financial matters.58 The effect of in-
vestor competence was also shown to be economically large and significant, and 
also to be an important factor supporting a decrease in the home bias of investors, 
as more competent investors would indeed invest more in foreign securities than 
other investors.59 
Support for the competence theory by Graham, Harvey and Huang (2009) was 
found in the paper by Abreu, Mendes and Santos (2011), who showed that Portu-
guese individual investors needed to acquire experience in their home market  
before would venture abroad and invest in foreign securities, and were willing to 
invest in foreign securities only after they felt competent about the benefits and 
risks involved in such investments. The decision to invest abroad was not only 
affected by their experience in the home market, however, but also by investors’ 
characteristics. Female, married, and older investors, as well as those with only 
basic education were shown to need more experience in the domestic market and 
to wait longer before they started to invest in foreign securities in comparison to 
wealthier investors or those with highly skilled jobs or more financial knowledge. 
                                                 
57 Graham, Harvey and Huang (2009), p. 1. 
58 Similar results that related the home bias phenomenon to investors’ demographic characteristics 
were also presented in Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), Zhu (2002), Karlsson and Norden (2007), 
and Kyrychenko and Shum (2009). In summary, investors with higher education level, higher 
income and of higher age were shown to be more likely to diversify their portfolios internationally. 
59 Bailey, Kumar and Ng (2008) reported similar results. 
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Further, and more importantly, the study also argued that investors’ experience 
obtained while investing in the domestic market as opposed to overconfidence 
was the key reason that helped them start investing abroad. Investors who ven-
tured abroad not only appeared to have better investment skills, but were indeed 
shown to improve their performance and to outperform domestic investors once 
they started investing in foreign securities. If the reason why investors entered 
foreign markets was just because they were overconfident, then their performance 
would not have improved afterwards. These results so helped understand the 
home bias, and also again confirmed that there are benefits for investors choosing 
to invest abroad. 
4.3.4 Familiarity 
The behavioral explanation of familiarity is a rather obvious and compelling con-
cept in the home bias literature, according to which people simply prefer to invest 
in the stocks of those companies that are already familiar to them, or that they 
generally regard as more favorable than other securities available to them. 60 For 
example, investors might strongly prefer those companies that publish their finan-
cial reports in their own native language (language effect), or that have chief   
executives coming from the same or similar cultural background as investors 
themselves (cultural effect).61 Also, investors were shown to be not only influ-
enced by the general information about a firm’s geographic location; instead it 
was also important for them to know more about a company’s specific identity so 
that they could form a connection or association with that firm.62  
Investors might also view themselves as being better informed about the familiar 
than about the unfamiliar, however, independent of actually having more and/or 
superior information about the firm itself. Familiar stocks are so perceived to  
potentially deliver higher returns than other investments (at lower risk), and inves-
tors might therefore shift their portfolios to those companies accordingly. 
                                                 
60 In their earlier paper Coval and Moskowitz (1999) have already related the preference for geo-
graphical proximity investors to the psychological desire to invest in the local community, i.e. to a 
cognitive bias for the familiar. 
61 See Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001). 
62 As indicated in Ackert, Church, Tompkins and Zhang (2005). 
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Most empirical studies discussing the familiarity effect were particularly con-
cerned with disentangling the local bias preference of investors from the asym-
metric information concept as suggested by Coval and Moskowitz (1999), and 
were indeed able to show that advantageous information alone might not have 
been the sole reason driving locally biased investments.  
 
In his fundamental paper, Huberman (2001) was the first to explicitly link the 
geographic bias of investors to the concept of familiarity. He examined the famili-
arity hypothesis by looking at the geographic distribution of the shareholders of 
the seven Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) in the U.S., major pro-
viders of local telephone services. The author was able to document an evidently 
large tendency of local resident investors to invest more in those companies that 
were operating in an area that was geographically closer: in most states, the frac-
tion of RBOC equity held by investors within the company’s local area was 
shown to be on average 2.76 times higher for local RBOCs than for out-of-state 
RBOCs (as of year-end 1996), i.e. disproportionately higher than the average 
amount invested in other RBOCs.  
Given this evidence of investors’ propensity to hold stocks in locally situated 
RBOCs, Huberman suggested, most importantly, that these results allowed for 
local investment to be seen as stemming from non-informational factors. The bias 
to invest in the familiar rather reflected investors’ tendency to be more optimistic 
about familiar stocks and not so much an exploitation of an informational ad-
vantage, as investors were shown to buy and hold these more familiar stocks in 
their portfolios but were less likely to trade them in response to new infor-
mation.63 Overall, Huberman thus considered the familiarity theory a very reason-
able explanation of the home bias phenomenon. 
 
                                                 
63 This observation also seems rather consistent with other behavioral explanations of the home 
bias that argue that investors feel more confident and optimistic about the expected returns of 
familiar stocks. People look more favorably upon such stocks and think of them as being more 
likely to deliver higher returns, as seen earlier. 
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In line with these findings was also the evidence presented by Zhu (2002), who 
equally confirmed the significance of familiarity for U.S. individual investors’ 
portfolio decisions. The paper showed that investors’ average portfolio composi-
tion was between 12.42 and 14.65 percent closer to their home base than to other 
domestic common stocks in the market, and concluded that although individual 
investors might be able to obtain more information on familiar companies, not all 
of this information was relevant in the sense that it also would provide investors 
with higher returns on their investments. While investors were indeed more in-
clined to invest in locally proximate companies than in more distant ones, there 
was no evidence found that they were able to achieve higher returns from their 
local bias, nor were they shown to outperform those investors with less local bias 
in their investments. Therefore, these results were seen as casting further doubt on 
the advantageous information explanation, and as lending additional support to 
the familiarity hypothesis. Unlike earlier examinations on local bias, Zhu directly 
concluded that the theory of advantageous information could not well explain  
individual investors’ behavior, and that investors were investing locally for rea-
sons other than information advantages; this was later also confirmed in Seasholes 
and Zhu (2010), where U.S. individual investors’ local portfolios equally could 
not be shown to generate higher performance (over a 1991 to 1996 sample        
period), as investors did not appear to have value-relevant information about the 
local stocks in their portfolios that might have helped them achieve superior re-
turns. These results thus directly contradicted conclusions reached earlier in    
papers such as Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2005) and Massa and Simonov (2006). 
 
Similar evidence was also delivered for institutional investors. Ke, Ng and Wang 
(2010), for instance, studied a sample of more than 3,000 mutual funds from 22 
developed and developing countries over a period from 2001 to 2002, and showed 
that mutual funds’ investment in U.S. firms that had a local presence in the funds’ 
home country were not generating any higher returns than a comparable bench-
mark portfolio. They also rather suggested that fund managers’ local investments 
were more likely driven by familiarity effects than by informational effects.  
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4.3.5 Loyalty 
Lastly, it can be postulated that investors might exhibit loyalty or emotional ties 
towards certain investment possibilities, which might significantly influence and 
effect their investment decisions. The idea of loyalty regarding its impact on in-
vestors’ decisions was first considered by Cohen (2009), who reflected on the 
emotional ties that employees might display towards their own company when 
considering their retirement money investment.64 In the paper, the loyalty bias 
towards company stock was defined as the overweighting of own-company stock 
in the investment portfolio due to a loyalty to the firm itself. Employees were as-
sumed to be truly convinced of their company being better than other companies, 
and so overestimated the performance of its stock because of their loyalty towards 
the firm.  
Employee loyalty was clearly shown to affect investors’ equity portfolio deci-
sions, whereas superior information as an explanation of employees’ preference 
for own company stock was more or less rejected. While employees were also 
investing more in such own companies that were more visible to them outside 
(through advertising, for example), moreover, they were shown to be especially 
loyal to and would invest more in those companies that maintained a constant firm 
structure, hierarchy, and management over a long period of time, factors which 
helped employees develop long-term loyalty with their firm.65 
Most interesting, however, was that Cohen also reported evidence on the cost of 
loyalty-biased investment decisions to employee investors, i.e. on the foregone 
returns from under-diversification. An employee was shown to lose almost 2 per-
cent in annual portfolio returns by not investing more variedly because of his/her 
loyalty bias – a potentially large loss which was shown to be even higher than the 
costs (foregone gains) that were normally associated with investors’ home bias. 
 
                                                 
64 Huberman (2001) regarded the choice of workers to invest some or all of their retirement contri-
butions in the stock of the company they were employed with as investing in the most familiar. 
65 The main sample period was from 1997 to 2000. 
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A second theory on loyalty then refers to investors’ loyalty or patriotic feelings 
towards their home country that might induce them to invest more at home than in 
other countries, and could so possibly explain (at least) part of the equity home 
bias. Morse and Shive (2011), for instance, showed that the effect of investors’ 
country loyalty on foreign equity holdings was even economically significant: a 
one-unit increase in patriotism was shown to lead to an 11 percentage decrease in 
the proportion of foreign holdings in an average country’s total equity holdings 
(over a sample period from 1995 to 1997). In the U.S., for example, investors  
located in more patriotic regions like West South Central were shown to invest the 
least in foreign equities, as they had stronger feelings about their home country 
and would clearly allocate more of their portfolio towards domestic stocks than 
towards stocks from other countries. Thereby, the effect of investor patriotism 
could be shown to be highly important both for explaining international invest-
ment allocations as well as for a better understanding of the equity home bias in 
general; overall, patriotic behavior was seen as at least partly responsible for the 
home bias phenomenon. 
A related patriotism theory was also provided by Bhattacharya and Groznik 
(2008). The paper introduced another measure of loyalty, namely the national 
country of origin of (immigrant) investors living in the U.S., where immigrants 
were assumed to view the investment opportunities in their country of origin more 
favorably than investments opportunities in other countries. The size of an immi-
grant group from a certain foreign country was shown to be positively correlated 
to overall U.S. investment in that particular (foreign) country, as immigrants 
would invest proportionately more in their own countries than any other country. 
Immigrants in the U.S. did not only consider the institutional characteristics of the 
country in their investment decisions, but particularly cared about the fact whether 
the country was their country of origin, and whether or not they still had strong 
family and cultural ties to their country. This effect has also been documented in 
Foad (2011), where immigration was shown to decrease the equity home bias by 
increasing the share of the domestic investors that have a preference for foreign 
equity in the adopted country. 
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4.3.6 Concluding Remarks 
While not providing a unifying explanation of the home bias itself, behavioral 
theory has significantly contributed towards finding a more meaningful interpreta-
tion of this international phenomenon. Behavioral biases such as familiarity 
(Huberman, 2001), loyalty (Cohen, 2009), patriotism (Morse and Shive, 2011), 
over-confidence (Kilka and Weber, 2000) and optimism (French and Poterba, 
1991) all help understand why investors might not diversify their investments to a 
larger degree, and why investors’ strong preferences in their investment decisions 
are significant for explaining the home bias.66 In contrast, investors with higher 
perceived investment competence were shown to be less likely to exhibit a home 
bias, with almost 51.6 percent of their portfolios invested internationally (versus a 
foreign portion of just 33.1 percent in less competent investors’ portfolios), as 
seen in Graham, Harvey and Huang, 2009. 
Overall, the behavioral literature has not only offered a new perspective on the 
international home bias puzzle, but it has also shown that investors’ behavior  
rather than institutional restrictions or factors have lead to an under-diversification 
of their portfolios. By uncovering some irrational patterns in investors’ portfolio 
decisions, the behavioral theories provide evidence that at least not all investors 
are merely influenced by the basics of portfolio theory, but rather reflect inves-
tors’ differing views and beliefs when making their decisions.  
                                                 
66 Further behavioral explanations might also include aversion to regret (Solnik, 2006), or down-
side equity risk (Campbell and Kraeussl, 2007). 
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5 Conclusion 
The traditional line of arguments that has been put forward as an explanation of   
the observed lack of international portfolio diversification initially included the 
existence of barriers to investment, like capital controls or market segmentation. 
The early empirical literature in this regard, however, can no longer be viewed as   
offering viable or adequate explanations of the home bias phenomenon, especially 
since the parallel decrease in the documented home bias has not been as drastic as 
the removal of capital barriers and similar other restrictions to international in-
vestment in recent years would suggest. Indeed, the home bias in investors’ port-
folios has not changed substantially since the unfolding of capital market liberali-
zation.  
 
Over the years, the home bias has largely persisted in every country around the 
globe, even among professional investors. This has lead to a focus on indirect  
barriers to investment as a possibly more relevant explanation of the bias, such as 
the existence of information asymmetries between investors from different coun-
tries. There is much evidence that foreign investors are more likely to invest in 
those countries that offer better government and corporate standards, which pre-
sumably enables investors to achieve higher returns. Also, investors were shown 
to hold stocks of foreign companies that are larger in size and more visible, i.e. 
more easily accessible to investors. It is further assumed that especially investors 
who are located geographically proximate to an investment opportunity do also 
have a substantial informational advantage over foreign investors, which even 
might allow them to perform better than other investors who are located further 
away. In that case, under-diversification and the resulting home bias were shown 
to be even tempered by the higher returns from investing locally.  
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It has also been argued that investors are heavily influenced by behavioral biases, 
since most rational theories have failed to fully explain the extent of the observed 
home bias. As such, behavioral explanations have generally been related to an 
expectation of higher returns from domestic investment, or equivalently to inves-
tors’ risk aversion as they falsely assume foreign investments to be more risky 
than they truly are, simply because they are foreign. Investors’ patriotism towards 
their own country or loyalty to their own company also seems to influence their 
investment decisions. It could also be inferred that domestic investors do perceive 
themselves as having an informational advantage over foreigners, which may, 
however, just be the result of behavioral biases that also lead to the home bias. 
This argument is particularly relevant given that the home bias phenomenon has 
remained so persistent over time. 
 
In summary, it can be said that all the empirical evidence that has been uncovered 
so far does imply that the home bias phenomenon can be seen as rather complex 
to explain and understand. The bias appears to be driven by a wider number of 
forces than previously assumed, and no single theory seems to offer a complete 
explanation or solution to the home bias puzzle. Investors’ portfolio decisions 
rather appear to be related to a mixture of all explanations presented in this paper, 
which are all valuable. Most factors are only able to explain a small portion of the 
home bias, and hopefully future research interest in this area will help clarify a 
larger part of investors’ home country preferences in coming years.  
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German Abstract 
 
Die Globalisierung der letzten Jahrzehnte führte zu einer Deregulierung und    
Liberalisierung der internationalen Finanzmärkte, und zu einer intensiven 
Verflechtung der nationalen Volkswirtschaften. Damit einher erschlossen sich für 
Investoren zunehmend internationale Investitionsmöglichkeiten und –alternativen. 
Die Empirie zeigt jedoch, dass sowohl private als auch institutionelle Investoren 
weitaus überproportionaler am jeweiligen Heimatmarkt investieren als dies nach 
der grundlegenden Darstellung der Portfoliotheorie vorteilhaft wäre.  
 
Ziel der vorliegenden Diplomarbeit ist es, dieses „Home Bias Phänomen“ -
welches auch als „Puzzle der internationalen Finanzmärkte“ bezeichnet wird - 
näher zu erläutern, und dessen Entwicklung und aktuelle Ausprägung im 
internationalen Umfeld zu beschreiben. In der empirischen Literatur dominieren 
im   Wesentlichen wichtige rationale Erklärungsansätze wie die Theorie über 
Informationsasymmetrien zwischen heimischen und ausländischen Investoren, 
sowie die Präferenz von Unternehmen in lokaler Nähe zum Investor. Offenbar 
spielen auch verhaltenswissenschaftliche Erklärungen, die psychologisch 
begründet werden, eine Rolle. Dazu zählen der relative Optimismus und ein 
höheres Selbstwertgefühl (Selbstüberschätzung) bei Entscheidungen über 
Investitionen am Heimatmarkt, das bevorzugte Investieren in bereits vertraute 
oder bekannte (nationale) Unternehmen, oder auch mögliche Treuegefühle zum 
Heimatland bzw. zu bestimmten Unternehmen. Selbst wahrgenommene höhere 
Kompetenz bei Finanzangelegenheiten wiederum hilft den Home Bias deutlich zu 
verringern.  
 
Die umfassende Darstellung aller relevanten Theorien zeigt, dass kein Effekt groß 
genug ist den Home Bias in seiner vollständigen Ausprägung zu erklären. 
Vielmehr scheint der Home Bias das Resultat eines komplexeren 
Zusammenspielens mehrerer Faktoren zu sein als ursprünglich angenommen, bis 
dato lässt sich daher das Phänomen jedoch nicht eindeutig erklären.  
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English Abstract 
 
Over the last few decades the ongoing globalization has led both to a deregulation 
and liberalization of international financial markets, and to a more intense inter-
dependence of national economies. This development has also been accompanied 
by a rampant increase in international investment opportunities. However, empiri-
cal evidence shows a clear tendency of private as well as institutional investors to 
invest disproportionately more in their home market than internationally, thereby 
not fully capturing the postulated benefits of portfolio diversification. 
 
This thesis aims to provide a clear definition of the home bias phenomenon – or 
so-called international finance puzzle – and to describe its evolution and current 
magnitude within international markets. In the empirical literature several im-
portant rational explanatory attempts have been put forward, like the theory of 
information asymmetries among national and foreign investors, or the preference 
for locally situated companies. Behavioral explanations based on psychological 
biases also seem to play an important role. These include investors’ relative opti-
mism and over-confident behavior regarding their domestic market investment 
decisions, the preferred investment in more familiar (domestic) companies, or 
investors’ loyalty towards their home country or towards certain companies. In 
contrast, perceived higher competence in financial matters helps mitigate the 
home bias substantially. 
 
A thorough examination of all significant theories shows that no single explana-
tion can capture the full extent of the observed home bias. The evidence rather 
points to the home bias phenomenon being caused by a complex interplay of vari-
ous factors, which hitherto cannot be unequivocally explained.  
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